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The productivity of small-scale sugarcane contractors affects not only their own
profitability and sustainability, but that of other stakeholders as well, such as the small-
scale sugarcane farmers they contract to and the sugar mills these farmers supply in the
form of improved services to growers and a steady flow of sugarcane to mills. This study
firstly illustrates the organisational structures of the sugar industry. It then aims to
identify constraints that inhibit the performance (such as timely haulage operations and
cost effectiveness) of small-scale sugarcane contractors in the small-scale sugar industry
of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN). To obtain this information, interviews were conducted with
124 randomly selected contractors from 11 mill group areas in KZN between September
2002 and July 2003. Case studies (concerning institutional issues such as organisational
structures) of contractors, sub-committee members, and development officers were also
conducted in eight mill group areas ofKZN between September 2002 and February 2004.
Sample statistics and case study results show that contractors face institutional constraints
(work allocation limitations, lack of performance incentives and high transaction costs,
such as negotiation costs, the risk of losing work and contract default risk), cash flow
problems, poor physical infrastructure and a lack of labour. It is concluded that the
promotion of a more competitive small-scale sugarcane contractor sector will alleviate
many of the problems (such as work allocation limitations) faced by small-scale
contractors, while providing incentives for the provision of higher quality and cheaper
services to small-scale sugarcane growers.
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The study also examines the attributes of small-scale sugarcane contractors that affect
their quality of service as perceived by small-scale sugarcane growers (SSGs) within
current institutions. Information is drawn from the same sample survey, although ten
observations from the Umfolozi area are excluded because they were not part of the
sample drawn from population lists. Further interviews were conducted in the same time
period with SSGs for information on contractor service quality (transport and general
service timeliness, meeting of daily ratable delivery requirements, low downtimes, good
staff management, and minimal disagreements on service terms). Results show that
factors affecting a contractor's perceived service quality include gender, training, the
quality of information used (industry focused information sources such as the South
African Sugar Association Experiment Station (SASEX) and the Ingede magazine, or
general sources such as the radio), and sugarcane tonnage transported (size of business).
Being a male contractor and having a larger business positively influence service rating
as perceived by SSGs. The importance of the quality of information used and increased
training levels highlights the need for the continual provision of relevant information and
training for sugarcane contractors by extension services (government, SASEX and
milling companies).
The study also identifies the need for further research on the issue of contractor
machinery costs. In a competitive sector contractors would need to have adequate
information on own costs in order to compare these with contract rates in the market.
Further guidance by extension staff and other industry advisors (e.g. development
officers) in the accessing of adequate finance may also be necessary.
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Government has a role in strategising the creation of land markets to promote efficient
use of resources (land), while providing improved rural infrastructure (mainly district
roads). Government also needs to ensure unbiased tribal court rulings, review the
impacts of minimum wage legislation on contractors sourcing labour, and provide
protection for those competing for work.
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INTRODUCTION
For many years the South African Sugar Association (SASA) has given attention to
small-scale farmers who consist primarily of previously disadvantaged black farmers.
SASA's efforts are largely responsible for the existence of approximately 48 000 small-
scale sugarcane growers, who currently form the bulk of 50 000 independent sugarcane
growers in South Africa (SASA, 2000; Davis, 2003). SASA's contribution to this
number is evident with the existence of Umthombo Agricultural Finance (UAF),
previously known as the Financial Aid Fund (FAF). FAF first started in 1973 and UAF
is now South Africa's largest private sector programme dedicated to funding agricultural
development in South Africa (SASA, 2002). Other contributors have been the 1996
empowerment initiatives of Ithala Development Finance, Illovo Sugar Limited and the
Tongaat-Hulett Group via innovative financing schemes to gain access to land, although
these are primarily aimed at promoting the development of previously disadvantaged
medium-scale farmers (Mashatola, 2003: I).
The small-scale sugarcane growers (SSGs) form an integral part of the sugar industry and
contribute an estimated 15 percent of the total sugarcane crop in South Africa, with the
remaining 85 percent coming from commercial farmers (72 percent) and miller-cum
planters (13 percent) (Mashatola, 2003: 10). The viability of SSGs is important from
both a rural development and economic perspective. Firstly, SSGs comprise primarily of
previously disadvantaged black farmers who contribute to rural economic growth through
the use of local contractor and labour services. Secondly, mills such as Amatikulu
1
receive a high proportion of their sugarcane (approximately 25 percent) from SSGs (Le
Gal & Requis, 1999). However, a serious drawback of the small-scale grower sector is
the farmers' inability to efficiently plant, grow, cut and deliver cane to mills, considering
the small size of their farms with a cutting average of between 1.5 and 2 hectares of
sugarcane (Le Gal & Requis, 1999). A collapse of the SSG sector is expected to have
marked effects on the flow of sugarcane to these mills.
Small-scale sugarcane contractors are generally described as SSGs, who provide essential
mechanical (land preparation, crop maintenance and cane haulage tasks) (Wiseman,
2003) and/or labour (sugarcane cutting) contracting services to fellow SSGs. However,
the productivity (timely haulage operations, low downtimes, competitive charge-rates) of
these contractors has been low with costly delays in transportation of sugarcane and
unreliability of the service (Sokhela, 1999). An improvement in the productivity of
contractors in providing the services farmers need is expected to benefit contractors
(lower costs and higher profitability) and growers (higher quality services at competitive
prices). Milling companies would also benefit through a more stable supply of higher-
quality sugarcane to their mills.
This study attempts to provide recommendations on how to improve the productivity and
viability of small-scale sugarcane contractors in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) from analysing
survey data, case study information and own observation. It also includes a review of
transport methods and methods of tractor acquisition regarding finance types and
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financial sources. In addition, it attempts to estimate depreciation and reparr and
maintenance (R&M) costs for small-scale contractor machinery.
Firstly, it is hypothesised that the institutional framework in which contractors currently
operate hinders their performance, which is reflected in widespread inefficiencies (under-
utilised equipment, low quality/slow haulage operations) found in the sector. Contractors
are likely to face high transaction costs (e.g. ex ante costs such as contract negotiation
costs, and ex post costs such as risk of contract default) and other constraints (e.g. cash
flow problems, a lack of infrastructure), which have a negative impact on their
operations. Good institutions (i.e. those that reduce uncertainty and other transaction
costs) are critical to promoting contractors' productivity, and a need for institutional
reform in the small-scale sugar industry has been identified (Wiseman, 2003; Le Gal &
Requis, 1999).
The study examines institutions that are perceived by contractors, sub-committee
members (organised groups of SSGs in local small-scale sugarcane growing areas) and
development officers to have a negative influence on the productivity of contractors in
the small-scale sugar industry. It discusses the formal entry requirements of a potential
contractor sourcing work, while highlighting traditional or informal institutional impacts.
Various factors (such as financial constraints, lack of competition and incentives, and
poor infrastructure) that currently have a negative impact on a contractor's performance
are also evaluated.
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Data for the study were collected between September 2002 and July 2003 on 124
contractors , who were randomly selected from eleven sugar mill areas in KwaZulu-Natal.
Contractors interviewed were all haulage contractors who practice direct haulage
(sugarcane haulage from field to mill), indirect haulage (sugarcane haulage from field to
loading zone) or both. In addition to the survey data, information concerning institutional
issues was drawn from case studies conducted between September 2002 and February
2004. The case studies include interviews with contractors , sub-committee members and
development officers from eight mill group areas ofKZN.
Secondly, the study identifies attributes of contractors that have a significant effect on the
quality of their service as perceived by SSGs (transport and general service timeliness,
meeting of daily ratable delivery requirements , low downtimes , good staff management,
and minimal disagreements on service terms). This can assist sugar industry extension
services in promoting these attributes through advice and training. It is in a SSG's best
interest to have his/her sugarcane delivered to the mill on time by way of little conflict
with contractors. All listed attributes are expected to impact either directly or indirectly
on the quality of service received by SSGs. Information for this analysis was based on a
sample of 114 contractors and on information regarding the quality of service provided
by contractors through interviews with some of their clients (SSGs).
Lastly, for contractors information on machinery costs is extremely important from a
charge-rate setting perspective. With the promotion of a competitive sector, contractors
will need to know their own machinery costs, which would enable them to charge rates at
4
a competitive level. The study also examines depreciation forecasting and comments on
the lack of information on maintenance and repairs within the industry. Policy
recommendations are provided in an attempt to alleviate the constraints placed upon
contractors , and suggestions are made to promote a more competitive industry and
contractor productivity.
In summary, the dissertation is structured as follows: Chapter 1 deals with the
organisation of the South African sugar industry and the small-scale sugarcane sector,
while Chapters 2 and 3 present the theory on contracts and institutions, and
characteristics of sample contractors and local institutions respectively. Factors
inhibiting small-scale contractor performance in KwaZulu-Natal are evaluated in Chapter
4. A contractor service quality model is presented and analysed in Chapter 5, while
Chapter 6 presents small-scale sugarcane contractor machinery costs and financing




ORGANISATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN SUGAR INDUSTRY AND THE
SMALL-SCALE SECTOR
This chapter gives a brief overview of how the South African sugar industry and small-
scale sugarcane sector are structured. It also includes information on the demand for, and
supply of, small-scale sugarcane contractors in KwaZulu-Natal.
1.1 Organisation of the South African Sugar Industry
The South African sugar industry consists of two core groups involved in producing
sugarcane and manufacturing sugar. These are the growers and millers who are
represented by the South African Cane Growers' Association (SACGA) and the South
African Sugar Millers' Association Limited (SASMAL) respectively. The affairs of the
entire sugar industry are administered by the South African Sugar Association (SASA)
which includes a council made up of an equal distribution of representatives from both
SACGA and SASMAL (Sokhela, 1999). An outline of the South African sugar industry
organisational structure is shown in Figure 1.1.
In South Africa, sugarcane is produced in three main areas, namely the KwaZulu-Natal
(KZN) Coast (comprising 68 percent of the total sugarcane area), the KZN Midlands
(comprising 17 percent of the total sugarcane area), and Mpumalanga (comprising 15
























Figure 1.1: Organisation of the South African sugar industry
(Source: adapted from Sokhela, 1999: 16)
produced has varied between 1.5 and 2.5 million tons a year, with 151 mills (see Figure
1.2) being responsible for processing sugarcane into sugar and associated saleable
products (e.g. syrup, molasses). Seven of these mills belong to Illovo Sugar Limited, five
to the Tongaat-Hulett Sugar Group, two to Transvaal Sugar Limited, and one to Union
Co-operative Limited (Le Gal and Requis, 1999). The proportion of small-scale
sugarcane growers to larger or commercial growers differs from one mill area to the next.
For example, the Umzimkulu and Noordsberg mill areas consist of relatively few small-
scale sugarcane growers. In contrast, small-scale growers are responsible for 20 to 40
I This includes Entumeni Mill which was still in operation at the time of the survey. It closed down at the
end of the 2002/03 milling season.
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Figure 1.2: South African sugarcane production and mill areas
(Source: SASRI, 2004)
8
percent of sugarcane delivered to the Glendale/, Entumeni, and Amatikulu mills (A'Bear
et al. , 1997).
1.2 Organisation of Small-Scale Sugarcane Farmers and Contractors
The structure of small-scale growers and their contractors is different to that found in the
large-scale commercial farm sector. Where commercial sugarcane growers are in direct
contact with the local grower council (council established in each mill supply area
representing the interests of local growers), the small-scale growers operate via a
different channel, namely through their respective sub-committees (committees
established in sub-locations of milling areas that represent the interests of SSGs in these
locations), local associations (recognised associations in mill areas with which SSGs and
contractors are registered) and mill cane committees (committees that are made up of
members from the various local associations in each mill area). The general
organisational structure for the small-scale sugarcane grower and contractor sector is
shown in Figure 1.3.
Figure 1.3 shows that SSGs are in contact with their respective sub-committees and
contractors, not the local grower council. The sub-committees are made up of, and
represent, SSGs from sub-locations within each mill area, while the contractors are
individuals that serve the SSGs. Not all areas have the same organizational structures, as
2 Discontinued its operations at the end of the 1997/98 milling season.
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some do not acknowledge local associations as having a right of influence over the sub-
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Figure 1.3: Organisation of small-scale sugarcane growers and contractors
(Source: adapted from Le Gal & Requis, 1999: 4)
1.2.1 Background to small-scale sugarcane farm contractors
In past studies that have primarily focussed on sugarcane growers, mention is often made
of the role contractors play in farming activities (Sokhela, 1999; Bates, 1979). An early
example of such a study was that done by Bates (1979), who referred to the existence of
contractors in the'Zulu Cane Grower' Sector. Bates found that due to the high demand
for, and price of, contractor services - as well as the distance of contractors from farms -
such services were difficult to obtain. He also pointed out that the unreliability of
contractors, such as high machinery downtimes, was the main reason for large quantities
of cut sugarcane being left rotting in the fields, while increasing the harvest-to-crush
period. The main operations for which growers made use of contractors were land
preparation and sugarcane transport. Further operations done by contractors were
planting, fertilizing and harvesting.
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Today, small-scale sugarcane contractors are still used for similar operations but they
exist in an increasingly deregulated sugar market where competitiveness is becoming
more important for industry players including SSGs (O'Reilly, 1998, cited in Le Gal &
Requis, 1999). Sokhela (1999) gives a 'rough' estimate of between 600 and 1200
contractors in the industry. He stated that the difficulty in estimation was due to the
informal nature of small-scale farm contractors. Sokhela's results showed that more than
80 percent of contractors in the industry during 1996 were involved with harvesting and
field-to-loading zone transport of cane. Land preparation, weed control and field-to-mill
transport of cane were further operations some contractors performed. Furthermore, most
contractors were found to be growers. Sokhela (1999: 98) says an "improvement in the
efficiency of contractors, will have a multiplier effect on the communities they serve",
i.e. the small-scale sugarcane growers. The efficiency of contractors is related to the
timeliness of their services, being low-cost service providers (i.e. 'wide' spreading of
fixed costs, and monitoring and control of variable costs enabling lower charge-rates), the
quality of their services provided, their management capabilities, etc. A'Bear et al.
(1997: 33) also add, "in most supply areas, contractors have emerged as the 'real'
growers, irrespective of whose land they are operating on. Their success, and therefore
the success of the industry, depends on the operation of their machines". Table 1.1 shows
estimates of total contractors in the industry per mill area, where available. Included are
types of haulage done, the number of growers hauled for and the total tonnage hauled in
each area.
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Table 1.1: Industry Statistics for Small-scale Sugarcane Contractors, 200112002
Total Indirect Direct Direct/ Total Total
Mill Area
Growers TonnageContractors Haulage Haulage Indirect
Amatikulu 96 89 6 1 6 109 199040
Entumeni 43 43 1 859 111 928
Eston 14 14 3050 91085
Felixton 75 75 4486 269939
Gledhow 39 38 1 7682 218447
Maidstone 55 55 2994 109636
Noodsberg 17 1 13 3 1 676 27443
Pongola 6 5 1 224 98000
Sezela 22 22 5055 185412
Umfolozi 150* 6000* 350000*
Umzimkulu 11 7 4 235 42634
Total 528 456 67 5 39370** 1 703 565
Source: Illovo Sugar Ltd. and Tongaat-Hulett Group representatives, 2002.
*Degree of accuracy may be questionable as population information was unavailable at the time of
sampling.
**This is not the total for the industry as small-scale growers are also found in areas where small-scale
contractors do not operate, e.g. Malelane and Komati.
1.2.2 Demand for contractors in the small-scale sugar industry
Continuing technological advancement of farming in the form of more expensive and
complex machinery and equipment has played a large role in increasing the need for
contractors worldwide by raising the break-even point at which growers are able to
justify their machinery purchase (Errington & Bennet, 1994). This effect has been
compounded by small farm sizes found in the small-scale sugarcane farm sector and has
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made it infeasible for growers to do their own machinery-requiring tasks. For the small-
scale sugarcane grower it often makes financial sense not to invest in relatively expensive
machinery, but to rather make contractual arrangements with contractors who will
provide a more' cost effective' source of machinery and even labour.
Farmers have increasingly sought out cheaper sources of labour and machinery
operations. Goedecke (1994: 385) maintains, "A contractor should be able to save the
farmer repair costs, management time, labour training and housing, the cost of idle
machinery, and improve cash flow." In doing so, the contractor would have to take on
most of these costs himself. In the United States of America (USA), studies have found
that wages paid by contractors are negotiated lower than those paid by farmers through
direct hiring (Vandeman et al., 1991). A contractor's ability to negotiate lower wages
and manage other costs (e.g. transaction costs) explain some of the reasons why
contractors are better able to save on costs relative to farmers.
1.2.3 Supply of contractors to the small-scale sugar industry
Wiseman (2003) states that most contractors are themselves SSGs and become
contractors for two main reasons. The first is a need to diversify, while the second is the
existence of low quality contractor services (untimely haulage operations), a major cause
of frustration for growers relying on them. A grower, who is unwilling to depend on
another for his machinery tasks, will need to purchase the required machinery himself.
Following the purchase of machinery, full utilisation will only be met by contracting out
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(considering the small-size of growers' farms), thus resulting in an increase in the supply
of contractors. Another factor increasing the number of contractors is the higher social
standing contractors rece ive in their communities. Although some of the younger
contractors in the sugar industry (between 30 and 40 years of age) were found to be more
profit motivated (Le Gal & Requis, 1999), many contractors are hypothesized to be
unprofitable and ineffic ient, or unproductive (Eweg, 2002b ; Wolhuter, 2002; Meyer,
2002). "Unprofitable and inefficient" contractors remain in the sector due to tonnage
allocation procedures based on egalitarian rather than performance principles. Thus, the
excess number of contractors has become a problem, and Sokhela (1999) points out that
even deaths have occurred due to the fierceness of competition.
1.2.4 Problems of timeliness and high charge-rates for SSGs
To date, productivity problems with the small-scale sugarcane contractors relate to the
poor timeliness of their operations (Sokhela, 1999) as well as their relatively low
management skills (Le Gal & Requis, 1999). Timeliness is important with respect to
customer satisfaction (Eggers, 1998), and for growers it becomes extremely costly if
delays occur in their cane transportation to mills. Le Gal and Requis (1999) maintain
there are four management capabilities the contractors need to have, namely management
of equipment and employees, management of customers , financial management, and
management of information. They further state that management problems often occur
relating (1) to machinery - old machinery has a high potential to break down; (2) to
customers - with a lack of time to search for new customers and to organise work for the
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entire season; (3) to finances - the lack of tax collections means no operating accounts or
depreciation calculations are required and are therefore not recorded, and (4) to
information because without records or accounting there is an inability to monitor and
evaluate activities, thus no support is provided for decisions in future investments or
business planning.
Market forces normally determine contractor rates in the commercial sector. This,
however, does not apply for small-scale sugarcane contractors as all contractors in a
specific area charge the same rates. These rates are set at the beginning of the season.
These fixed rates are calculated by local associations in the area and are based upon the
previous season's figures that are adjusted for inflation (Le Gal & Requis, 1999).
Commercial contractors, i.e. large-scale contractors mainly providing services to
commercial farmers, tend to charge far lower rates than those set for small-scale
sugarcane contractors. This may reflect the higher unit costs that the average small-scale
sugarcane contractor faces when performing similar operations as a commercial
contractor. For some, these set rates still remain too low considering that they
continually incur losses (Eweg, 2002b; Wolhuter, 2002), which is an indication of the
productivity problems of small-scale sugarcane contractors. Nevertheless, this may be
explained by the conditions under which the contractors work: for example, they usually
contract work that covers far less area or tonnage than what large farmers and contractors
regard as necessary to break even (cost spreading by large contractors), and road
infrastructure in the small-scale farming areas is relatively poor, thus contributing to high
repair and maintenance costs (Sokhela, 1999).
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1.3 Need for Research on Contractors in the Small-scale Sugar Industry
Problems of timeliness and high charge-rates have already been highlighted (Le Gal &
Requis, 1999; Sokhela, 1999). These still exist despite their recognition. Further
problems associated with low tonnages , field access, poorly maintained roads (Rau, 1988;
Meyer, 1988), a lack of contractor organisational structure , a lack of business skills and
poor equipment (Institute of Natural Resources, 1998) have also been documented, yet
continue to exist.
While there have been various published articles concerning commercial contracting
operations in South Africa (Porter & Phillips-Howard, 1997; Newman & Ortmann, 1996;
Goedecke & Ortmann, 1993), few studies, including unpublished articles, have made
mention of small-scale contractor operations in the South African sugar industry (Sokhela
1999; Le Gal & Requis, 1999; Institute of Natural Resources, 1998; 1999; Meyer, 1988;
Rau, 1988). The lack of information on small-scale sugarcane contractors and the
problems linked to their operations is evidence of a need for further research in this field.
Peer-reviewed articles need to be published and more informative documents made
available to the industry, in the hope that helpful answers are found in solving these and
other problems of the small-scale contractor sector. This study intends to make a
contribution towards such solutions.
16
CHAPTER 2
THEORY ON CONTRACTS AND INSTITUTIONS
Contract theory, including contracting alternatives and the benefits of contracting, is
examined in Chapter 2. Institutional and competition theory are also discussed with
special reference to induced institutional innovation.
2.1 A Review of Contract Theory
The broad range of agricultural contract types (custom farming, contract farming, etc.)
shows the diverse needs of unique farms with respect to their different characteristics and
situations. A farmer can consider any of a selection of contracting types ranging from
entering into a custom farm agreement to providing contracting services himself.
Dorward (2001) maintains there are three critical dimensions that affect the choice of a
contracting arrangement. These are (1) uncertainty (i.e. contract enforcement), (2) asset
specificity, and (3) the frequency with which transactions recur. Furthermore, Dorward
classifies contracts into three classes of intensity. The first extreme class of contracts are
those at the "neo-classical spot market" level. These exist when the contracts are
extremely short-term in nature and develop due to lower levels of transaction risk
exposure or lower costs of transacting on an open market (these costs are closely
examined later in the chapter). The second extreme class of contracts occurring are those
of vertical integration (inclusion of up and down-stream firms in a single firm) (Gillespie
et al., 1997) when open market transaction risk exposure is higher. The final and
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medium-term contract class include bilateral contracts, where transaction risk exposure
lies between the extremes. Each class of contracts is associated with different forms of
governance with different co-ordinating and control mechanisms, contract law,
disturbance and adaptive abilities. Each contract class is therefore applicable to
transactions with different characteristics. Contracts between SSGs and contractors are
not voluntary and may reflect the Coasian approach, where sugar industry authorities
insist on contractual arrangements between the two parties with the aim of reducing
transaction and information costs (Coase, 1937). The following section provides a few
examples of contract types available to the farmer and/or contractor.
2.1.1 Contracting alternatives
Firstly, there is a contracting form referred to as custom farming. This involves a
situation where landowners, although retaining close control of the farm business, are not
actively involved in day-to-day activities. The landowner is involved in most farming
decisions (e.g. arranging for input purchases) and receives all income from output sales.
The contractor provides equipment and labour to perform all crop production activities
and is paid a lump sum for his/her services. Further payments may also be a percent of
the profits (Outlaw, 2002). A less constraining or specific custom farming type is
contract farming. Contract farming is more representative of the South African sugar
small-scale contractor sector and will be dealt with in more detail following this section.
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Sub-contracting is a type of contract within a contract where a contractor, normally large
in business size, sub-contracts tasks to others. This occurs in order to assist the larger
contractors with timeliness (Goedecke, 1994). In other words, a contractor could contract
out a task for which he has been contracted to perform when that specific task is unable
to be done in time without a sub-contractor's help. Improvement in efficiency (lower
transaction costs such as labour negotiations) may also be found where sub-contractors
do specialised tasks, e.g. a sugarcane contractor may sub-contract labour sourcing
operations to another contractor who has good relations with local labour and more
experience in labour management.
Farmers, where necessary, may sell contract services where it will pay them to do so.
This usually is the case when farmers have excess machinery capacity due to the small
size of their farm business. The decision by a farmer to be either a buyer or seller of
contract services depends not only on the size of his business but also on the availability
of labour on the farm, i.e. as found on dairy farms where there is a need for flexible
labour (Errington & Bennett, 1994).
Although not a direct type of contracting, share farming could be a useful alternative with
respect to farming for individuals having limited capital resources. Share farming is the
provision of capital by two parties, where costs and returns are generally shared in the
same proportion as the share of capital given (Wright, 1990); in other words, a
partnership. Instead of contracting in services where there is a lack of machinery, for
example, a farmer could form a partnership with another who has access to the required
19
machinery. In this case both share the risks associated with farming as both are paid out
by profits. This has the advantage that both partners' interests are in alignment, i.e. farm
profit is the incentive for both parties (farmer and machinery owner) as neither is
guaranteed a fixed payment (e.g. a haulage rate per ton) as is the case with contracting.
This type of arrangement in the small-scale sugar industry may prove difficult from a
contract enforcement perspective, as legal uncertainty exists for lower status individuals
(e.g. women).
Contract farming
Drescher (2000: 395) defines contract farming as "the production of legally independent
firms for a future market that includes arrangements to the periodicity of services, time of
services, and quantities and qualities that can have an influence on structure,
organisation, and disposition of the farm-firms." Such contracts are diverse in nature due
to duration, authority and investment differences. Wright (1990: 177) simply states that,
"contract farming can be defined as a joint venture between two parties, normally a
landowner and a farm contractor", where the landowner provides the land and fixed
capital, and the contractor provides machinery, labour and management. Although the
latter definition seems to class contracts into a single category, this is not so where
contracts are found to differ from agreement to agreement, such as in the South African
small-scale sugarcane contractor sector. This is because the division of resources tends
not to be rigid, i.e. some contractors provide only cane cutting services, others may only
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transport the sugarcane, a few may primarily involve themselves with land preparation
tasks, and many may do all, or provide a mix, of the services mentioned.
Some advantages of contract farming for the landowner are that the burdens and expenses
of employing and buying machinery are removed. Also, contractors associated with
contract farming provide a channel through which new farmers can enter the agricultural
sector without the need of a large capital base. Although, to many farmers, this would
not be the ideal route to take, new entrants are often constrained by the high capital
requirements in farming (Stubbs & Williams, 1997). Also, another advantage to farmers
would be that labour contractors can provide casual labour needed for seasonal farm
work (Vandeman et al., 1991). A disadvantage of contract farming for landowners is that
operations are not always completed on a timely basis or when it best suits them.
Contractors will often provide services to several landowners which spreads them
'thinly', thus making it impossible to cater for the needs of all those to which they
contract. Further disadvantages for landowners are their payment responsibilities for
seed, fertilizer, other production inputs and payments to the contractor, with cost
responsibilities being specific to each contract. Because each of these costs are sunk or
irretrievable, while returns are variable, contract farming from the landowner's point of
view is risky (Outlaw, 2002).
There are several advantages for the contractor. Firstly, contracting can offer a fixed
return. This is found in the sugar contracting sector where the contractor is paid a
previously agreed upon rate for performing his services. Secondly, little additional
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capital is required above that of machinery already purchased. Some additional costs are
those of fuel, lubrication and repairs. Potential high repair bills are important contracting
risks to be aware of. However, this risk is of much less concern compared to the risks
attached to price and yield fluctuations faced by the farmer (Outlaw, 2002; Eggers, 1998).
Lastly, labour contractors can spread their recruitment costs over a number of short-term
contracts thus giving them an advantage in recruiting labour for seasonal tasks
(Vandeman et al., 1991). A disadvantage for custom operators (contractors) is that in a
good farming year they will earn less than if on a conventional lease (where the
landowner leases land to another who performs all operations and receives all income
from the crop); this is one trade-off for risk faced by the farmer (price and yield
fluctuations) being avoided by the contractor (Outlaw, 2002).
Currently, non-contracting farmers who face high financial stress (i.e. high debt), may
find entering into a contractual agreement a viable option. The farmer would then be able
to sell off machinery, thus raising capital that could be used to reduce borrowings.
Further, operating and labour costs can be saved, thereby decreasing short-term working
capital requirements although contractors would still need to be paid once tasks (cutting,
haulage) were completed (Wright, 1990).
2.2 Transaction Costs and the Benefits of Contracting
There are various reasons why contractual arrangements are chosen over open market
transactions. Most of these are linked to the costs of negotiating on an open market.
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These costs are best described as transaction costs which are linked to information costs
as well as uncertainty or moral hazard, asset specificity and risk (Frank & Henderson,
1992: 941). All of these play a role in determining the extremity of the costs when
participating in open markets. Coase (1937) highlights a solution to this, namely to allow
some authority to direct resources moving through markets, as in the small-scale
sugarcane contractor market in KwaZulu-Natal. In other words, this allows for the
control and alignment of resource flows by a single authority while eliminating the
transaction costs arising if more than one authority were involved. Not only is
contracting a means of doing this (the authority being the law responsible for enforcing
the contract), but more extreme methods of coordination can be adapted, e.g. vertical
integration. Although most small-scale contractors are integrated into fanning, of more
importance is the relationship between contractors and SSGs. Furthermore, the tonnage
of sugarcane grown by each contractor is relatively small compared to the total tonnage
hauled and would have very little bearing on their operations as a contractor.· The
following sections take a closer look at transaction costs and the factors influencing these
costs.
2.2.1 Transaction costs
Transaction costs are often contrasted with the costs of production and processing
(Dorward, 1999). Nevertheless, it should be noted that transaction costs form part of the
overall cost of production. Total production costs include inputs, such as land, labour, .
and capital, which are used in changing the attributes of goods, as well as those involved
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in transacting, i.e. defining, enforcing and protecting the property rights of goods (North,
1990). In other words, the sum of basic production costs and transaction costs equal the
total cost of production.
Transaction costs are the costs, including .risk, of negotiating and concluding a separate
contract for each exchange transaction that takes place in the market. Also included are
intangibles (e.g. searching for a SSG with whom to contract), and contract monitoring
and enforcement (North, 1990). Arrow (1970, cited in Dorward, 1999: 480) defines
transaction costs as "the costs of running the economic system". Transaction costs
include ex ante, mostly fixed costs (e.g. drafting and negotiating agreements) and ex post,
mostly variable (e.g. moral hazard) costs (Eggertson, 1990, cited in Zylbersztajn, 2003).
A problem in including transaction costs in econorrnc analysis is the difficulty of
estimating them empirically as most transaction costs are unobservable. This is because
transaction costs are varied, most often intangible, are not measured by standard
businesses, are never included in national statistics, and involve risk which is itself
intangible (Dorward, 1999). Nevertheless, transaction cost economics has in the past
been successfully used in economic analysis to explain patterns in the organisation of
agricultural production, in particular where it has been applied to problems of tenancy
and labour contract choice (Vandeman et al., 1991).
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2.2.2 Information costs
Key assumptions of perfect competition are perfect information and costless exchange.
However, in the real world information is most often costly and asymmetrical (Dorward,
200I). The main costs arising out of incomplete or asymmetric information relevant to
transaction costs are those of establishing contact and relations with other parties,
screening both the commodity transacted and the other party, negotiation, monitoring and
enforcement (North, 1990). These costs are incurred in an attempt to reduce risks that are
endogenous to transactions (Dorward, 1999). Coase (1937) points out that the cost of
information can be reduced by the entry of specialists who can sell such information on
the market. However, he adds that the costs could never be completely eliminated in this
way.
Costs, such as the lack of information, are sometimes specific to production processes or
methods of production. Farmers need to keep up with the times and a way to survive in
today's highly competitive markets would be through the use of appropriate technologies.
The only way to effectively utilise such technologies would be through the use of
information on them, such as what they are, how to apply or use them, etc. "Practical
examples of the increased use of information and control systems are irrigation
scheduling and moisture level monitoring systems, electronic individual ration balancing
and feed dispensing systems in dairy production, building utilization and flow scheduling
systems in livestock production, equipment sequencing and scheduling in crop
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production, and quality assessment and assurance systems including feed additive use and
fat/lean content in hog production" (Boehlje, 1993: 8). These examples show the
importance of acquiring information and why the attached costs are necessarily incurred.
However, specifically to contractors, these fixed information costs can be spread over
many farmers. For example, if a sugar industry machinery contractor has the necessary
information on how to adopt a technology that decreases the delay between harvest and
crushing of the sugarcane, he could apply his knowledge over a number of farmers - an
example of economies of scope where the information costs are spread.
2.2.3 Less risk and uncertainty
There are two main categories of risk, namely operating risk and financial risk (BoehIje,
1993). Operating risk in using the pricing mechanism may involve the risk of not being
supplied some article or service needed in production as well as others such as low yield
risk, price risk, etc. Contracting is one method to counteract such risk, i.e. it guarantees
the supply of a service by having a contractor bound in an agreement to do so. However,
such risk reduction may be "offset by the increased risks of contract breach, contract
terms , contract negotiation, and limited ability to alter production plans and enterprise
mixes to take advantage of other opportunities" (Barry, Sonka, & Lajili, 1992, cited in
Featherstone & Sherrick, 1992: 1233).
Financial risk (adverse selection) refers to the risk between lenders and borrowers
(Boehlje, 1993). Risk relating to moral hazard for the lenders and fixed debt repayment
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risk for the borrowers are the most common examples. Moral hazard risk could be
substantially decreased if lenders were to be more closely involved with the borrowers ,
thus enabling them to monitor any chances of the borrowers misusing the money lent to
them. This is therefore linked to information for lenders regarding their borrowers.
Uncertainty, which is related to the scope for opportunism (moral hazard) by the other
party in a transaction and a lack of information, is an important factor increasing
information gathering costs and risk (Dorward, 2001). Uncertainty, however, does not by
itself lead to the risk of financial loss in a transaction. The loss is incurred through a firm
investing in specific assets or fixed costs that are unable to be recovered following the
failure of a transaction. Therefore, both uncertainty and asset specificity are key
transaction characteristics that affect a firm's exposure to risk and thus play a role in
determining what type of contractual arrangement can be used to reduce transaction costs
(Dorward, 2001). It could be said that in a world of uncertainty an optimum .distribution
of contracts is observed rather than there being one single optimum contract because
agents have different levels of risk aversion (Vandeman et al., 1991).
2.2.4 Improved scale and size economies
Not only are there benefits in contracting with regards to lowering transaction costs, but
economies of size and scale are also important benefits to both the landowner or farmer,
as well as the contractor. Economies of size are obtained by spreading the fixed costs of
a firm (including fixed transaction and information costs) over a larger output, thus
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· resulting in a lower cost per unit output. Economies of scale are the combined impact of
increases in all factors of production on farm revenue increases. The extent of economies
of scale are measured by what proportional increases or decreases there are with respect
to farm profit increases over factor of production increases (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1995:
212-219).
The main advantage of contracting for farmers would be when they have a small farm or
limited borrowing capacity, because they would still be able to manage their farm and
make most of the production and marketing decisions without investing in a full line of
machinery (Ball, 1987; Outlaw, 2002; Eggers, 1998). This is of vital importance to the
small-scale farmers of the South African sugar industry, as farming would become
extremely costly with the purchase of all equipment needed. Contractors have the
advantage of serving a number of farmers. For example , with the purchase of a tractor
and plough they are not limited to the land preparation tasks of a single farm, but are able
to contract their services to a number of farms, hopefully utilising the acquired machinery
to its full capacity. In doing this the contractor takes advantage of economies of size, i.e.
spreading the fixed cost of the tractor and plough over a larger area of land prepared.
Ball (1987: 482) states that "agricultural contractors can achieve economies of size
beyond the reach of individual farmers by the use of sophisticated and expensive
machinery". In other words, contractors are able to access technologically advanced
machinery, make the necessary investments and improve output, while more than
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proportionally increasing profitability with respect to the increased set of factors of
production.
2.2.5 Effect of labour unions
Of increasing importance with regard to labour employment are the high costs associated
with union activity. The worldwide struggle for and success of unionisation has
challenged management's exclusive control of the labour process. This has also
increased the costs of hiring labour, where improvements in working conditions, higher
wage rates and other benefits for labour have become evident (Vandeman et al., 1991).
Goedecke and Ortmann (1993) state that labour contractors are often employed in South
Africa where they have the ability to help farmers in avoiding union activity. Vandeman
et al. (1991) show that there is a higher probability of contract employment for
undocumented workers and non-union workers, which reveals the preference of
employing workers that pose less of a threat to management control.
2.2.6 Trust, negotiation, monitoring, authority and enforcement
For a long time, farmers have been suspicious of contractors doing their work for them
and so trust is always a concern in contractual agreements, even to the extent that some
farmers have refused to deal with contractors (Goedecke & Ortmann, 1993). Trust is a
very important aspect in any type of joint venture as it reduces ex post transaction costs.
The closer the relationship between parties, the more likely is a joint venture (Wright,
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1990). Close communication between the landowner and contractor is essential and since
the objectives of the two are different, each must have a clear understanding of the
other's position and expectations, i.e. number of hectares to be cut and tonnage carted.
These should be agreed upon before any contract is drawn up. A contract should be
designed to significantly reduce the conflict between the farmer and contractor, and
should outline the responsibilities of both with a negotiated payment rate that is spelled
out clearly (Outlaw, 2002). However, there is no need for an elaborate contract, but
rather one that notes the most important points in avoidance of misunderstandings later
during performance of the tasks set forth in the contract (Eggers, 1998). Trust is a
substitute for an elaborate control and therefore reduces transaction costs.
Neilson (1986: 75) defines negotiation as "dialogue between parties in order to reach an
agreement. The starting point is a difference which needs to be bridged by movement or
compromise. The outcome is a deal, contract or arrangement which both parties are
committed to fulfil". He states that the process of negotiation should include a time of
preparation, discussion, bargaining, and an agreement. Refining these skills has become
evermore important for successful farming and agribusiness related firms (Boehlje,
1993), such as contracting businesses. This will enable a party to either obtain products
and services in a cost effective manner, or sell products and services at an attractive price.
Within an agreement, the degree of authority concentrated in the hand of one contract
party represents the rights of that individual to issue directives. This authority will
increase for the contractor with an increase in the influence he has on the management
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decisions of the farmer. In contrast, it will decrease as fewer rights are conceded by the
farmer (Drescher, 2000).
To allow for both efficient transactions (low transaction costs regarding moral hazard or
uncertainty) and adequate investment there is a need to enforce contracts. Sometimes
public institutions responsible for enforcement fail, especially when they are weak, as
found in some developing countries. Alternative mechanisms of enforcement are those
of external or internal private contract mechanisms (Gow et al., 2000). External
mechanisms are of third party 'mafia-type' agents, who, however, often come with
unwanted externalities (crime). Alternatively, there are those mechanisms that are
internal in nature, i.e. self-enforcing contractual agreements. This is done by increasing
the costs of contract breaches for the party who is most likely to breach, i.e. the party that
incurs less of a cost following the breach of a contract. With a lower chance of a contract
breach and therefore a relatively lower cost for the other party, the now 'more enforced'
contract may provide an incentive for further contract-specific investments. An example
of . internal enforcement is that of the input provision and investment facilitation
programme introduced by Juhocukor, a Slovakian sugar processor, for its producers of
sugar-beet. With Juhocukor's increased investment at the farm level, the processor had
an interest not to breach because its own costs of a breach had been substantially
increased. Also , the breaching costs for producers were lower, thus facilitating an
increased investment into sugar-beet production. In the event of a breach by the
processor, producers would not have to pay for their inputs and would only lose returns to
their labour and personal capital (Gow et al., 2000).
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2.2.7 Bargaining power and asset specificity
Bargaining power is a similar concept to that of authority, except that its degree is not
conceded by the farmer or decided upon in an agreement by those involved in a
contractual arrangement. Rather, bargaining power is evident through, and brought on
by, the specific situation surrounding the contract, i.e. many or few contractors, as well as
the characteristics each contracting party has. For example, the larger a farm, the more
bargaining power the landowner will have. This is because the contractor who is in a
contractual arrangement on that farm will value the continuation of the contract higher
than if the farm was small and offered less business . It has, therefore, been found that
larger farms receive better deals with regard to the contractual arrangements they enter
into (Goedecke, 1994).
Again, as with transaction costs and related uncertainty, asset specificity also has an
effect on the bargaining power of a contracting party. As shown by Hendrikse and
Veerman (2001), the unforeseen problems that may occur with a contract will not leave
the remaining surplus equally distributed between the parties, but will rather adversely
affect the party who has invested the most in specific assets as his bargaining power
would be weak. However, if both parties were to make contract specific investments that
would not be useful with a premature end to the contract, a 'locked-in' situation will
occur (Katz, 1989, cited in Drescher, 2000). This may protect both parties from each
other 's opportunism as long as none of the parties maintain several contractual
agreements that are homogenous in nature, i.e. if a contractor maintains a similar contract
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with more than one farmer the contractor has an ability to neglect the 'locked-in '
situation (Drescher, 2000).
2.3 Institutions and Competition
New Institutional Economics (NIE) combines economic theory with institutional
economics. Previous analyses were conducted separately by neo-classicists and
institutionalists (Langlois, 1986: 5). Although the term NIE originated from Oliver
Williamson (Coase , 2000), the original theory came from Coase's (1937) paper, Nature
of the Firm. Now, "under NIE, some of the unrealistic assumptions of neo-classical
economics (such as perfect information, zero transaction costs, full rationality) are
relaxed, but the assumption of self-seeking individuals attempting to maximise an
objective function subject to constraints still holds" (Kherallah & Kirsten, 2002: 112).
The theory of New Institutional Economics highlights transaction costs and the
institutions promoted to lower them (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985). It also explains
the evolution of institutions and assesses their economic performance, efficiency, and
distribution impacts (Kherallah & Kirsten, 2002). These same institutions can, however,
impact negatively on individuals by forming constraints on potentially positive human
interaction, e.g. dissuading otherwise healthy competition in an economy. North (1990:
27) states that the existence of institutions can be explained through a joint understanding
of human behaviour and transaction costs, with the costliness of information being the
key to transaction costs. Institutions are seen as the "rules of the game" that shape human
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interaction and are put m place m order to reduce uncertainty by orgamzmg this
interaction.
There are both formal and informal institutions. Formal institutions are the rules devised
by policy makers (laws, markets, contracts, etc.), while informal institutions are merely
conventions and codes of behaviour (traditions, customs, etc.). Policy makers have
limited ability in influencing informal institutions but play a major role in deciding upon
formal institutions or the rules by which individuals need to interact (North, 1990: 8).
North says that institutional theory and development begins with the individual human
being for whom institutions are created. In the small-scale sugarcane sector in KwaZulu-
Natal (KZN) insight into, and development of, institutions may only be possible by firstly
understanding the relationships between contractors and SSGs within their environment.
Beghin and Fafchamps (1995: 288) state that "good governance relates to government
policies and institutions which promote markets and efficiency, by defining the rules of
the game which allow transaction costs to be reduced and so enlarge the effective flow of
goods and services." Furthermore, Hay (1993) says that the promotion of economic
efficiency is one intention of competition. Sandmo (2000: 7) defines this economic
efficiency as an "achievement of efficient resource allocation" or capital flow to sectors
of production where the rate of return is highest. He further states that the aim of policy
makers should be to reduce prices to competitive levels, something that is only possible
through the promotion of a competitive market.
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Porter's five-forces model (Porter, 1985) highlights five forces that can be adopted to
identify what affects a contractor 's competitive state in a free market system: suppliers of
key inputs (sources of finance, equipment, fuel, repairs, all coupled with the bargaining
power or ability of contractors in accessing these), substitute products (for those offering
hand loading services it may be mechanical loading operations), potential new entrants
(currently entry of contractors to the SSG market in KZN is at the discretion of groups of
SSGs/sub-committees and is normally granted), customers (bargaining power with the
SSGs they serve), and rivalry between competitors (jockeying for a competitive
advantage over other contractors). Another important aspect to consider in a competitive
market is the role of consumer (SSG) demand linked to product value. Kennedy et al.
(1997) define customer value as the perceived value of a product's "bundle of benefits"
relative to the price paid for the product. For a contractor to be competitive, this ratio
.needs to exceed that of his rivals. In the small-scale contracting sector in KZN there may
be limited options for differentiation (hauling other products such as timber or water),
and low-cost leadership may prove to be the defining factor for determination of a
contractor's competitive advantage. Kennedy et al. (1997) maintain that cost
competitiveness depends on variable costs (fuel, repairs and maintenance), sunk costs
(larger investments such as specialised capital, e.g. cane carting equipment), and
transaction costs (uncertainty or risk). Good institutions, in part, are those that facilitate a
competitive market by aiding a reduction in transaction costs.
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2.3.1 Induced institutional innovation
The benefits of good institutions are obvious. However, bringing about institutional
change may not be as simple. Ruttan and Hayami (1984) highlighted an endogenous
theory of institutional innovation from a demand point of view with a brief explanation of
the supply of institutional change. Bardhan (1989), however, better explains the supply
of institutional change through highlighting resistance to change in the form of vested
interests and power struggles within collective action and the cost of collective action
itself. In the small-scale contracting sector there may be a demand for institutional
change regarding contractors sourcing their own work, and organisations such as SASA
and SASEX may see benefits in promoting such change (supply). However, power
interests within local associations and sub-committees may prevent this from happening.
Unless potential losers are identified and compensated, changing the institutional




CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLE CONTRACTORS AND LOCAL
INSTITUTIONS
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 explain the institutional environment in which small-scale sugarcane
contractors operate. The information used in these sections is derived from sample
survey data and case study interviews. Data sources and characteristics of the sample
contractors are presented in the next section.
3.1 Data Sources and Characteristics of Sample Contractors
The data include the responses of a survey conducted by Joint Venture3 and mill
extension staff who interviewed 124 small-scale contractors between September 2002
and July 2003 (see Appendix lA for the questionnaire used). The study area includes
eleven of the main small-scale sugarcane grower areas, namely Umzimkulu, Sezela,
Eston, Maidstone, Noodsberg, Gledhow (including Glendale), Amatikulu, Entumeni,
Felixton, Pongola and Umfolozi. Two small-scale sugarcane areas, Malelane and
Komati, were omitted because no small-scale contractors were active there. Large-scale
contractors service the small-scale growers in these two areas (Eweg, 2002b).
3 Staff from both the South African Sugar Association Experiment Station and the KwaZulu-Natal
Department of Agriculture and Environmental Affairs who are currently working in partnership.
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Contractors that were interviewed included those randomly selected, with replacement",
from population lists supplied for each mill area. However, due to the lack of
information on the contractor population, the data gathered from ten Umfolozi area
contractors did not form part of the original random sample. These contractors were
randomly selected by extension staff operating in this area and were included in the
descriptive statistics.
The population was stratified in two ways, namely by topography and whether a
contractor conducted direct or indirect haulage tasks. The sample was drawn using a
constant sampling fraction across the strata. Three levels of topography were chosen due
to the impact hauling on steep slopes is expected to have on contractor costs",
Furthermore, due to the low occurrence of contractors transporting high tonnages, all
those contractors who were listed as transporting more than la 000 tons of sugarcane per
year were included in the sample (the intended sampling fraction for this stratum was 100
percent, although three observations were lost reducing the sampling fraction to 77
percent). This was done to allow for an adequate spread of tonnage in the data. Also,
Mashatola (2002) observed that the average tractor usage break-even point lies close to
the 10 - 12 000 ton range. Table 3.1 presents the eventual strata sampled at constant
sampling fractions (See Appendix 2 on how each haulage area was categorised).
Although the original sampling fraction was 34 percent, nine observations were lost
which brought the sampling fraction within the 31 and 33 percent range for five of the
4 This method was used so that the population list need not be re-numbered following the selection of every
contractor.
5 Failure to calculate contractor costs due to a lack of information made inclusion of topographical
information in the study unnecessary.
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strata. Also, the sampling fraction for the DirectIF1at stratum was 100 percent due to the
population including only one observation. Contractors either missing or those that had
stopped contracting were replaced by randomly selected individuals from the same
stratum. Fifteen replacements were made; however, due to time constraints, nine missing
contractors were not replaced. According to initial analyses, the tonnage distribution of
the population and sample were very similar, which indicates adequate representation of
the population by the sample regarding tonnage hauled.
Table 3.1: Sampling Fractions For Strata (nlN)
Undulating & Steep & Steep to Flat
Undulating to Flat Flat
Indirect 48/147 (33%) 11/34 (32%) 17/55 (31%)
Direct 9/27 (33%) 18/58 (31%) 1/1 (100%)
Those transporting more than 10 000 tons 10/13 (77%)
Table 3.2 presents the number of contractors interviewed in each mill area while Table
3.3 summarises the characteristics of respondents. Firstly, the contractors hauling more
than 10 000 tons only influenced the tonnage mean and so are included in calculating the
other characteristics. The mean age and years of contracting experience for contractors
are 52 and ten, respectively. Just over 13 percent of the sample contractors are female
while 77 and 53 percent have other sources of income and skills, respectively. Other
sources of income include 31 different types such as farming, taxi operations, and various
public employrnents (teaching, Department of Health service, Department of Agriculture
service). There are 30 skills listed, such as crop maintenance, land preparation,
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mechanical servicing, various management skills, and other entrepreneurial skills (block
laying, painting, boiler making, panel beating, trading, welding).
Table 3.2: Contractors Interviewed in Each Sugar Mill Area, 2002/03













An average of 4 757 tons of sugarcane is transported by sample contractors per year
(excluding purposively selected contractors transporting more than 10 000 tons), which is
about 1 500 tons less than the mean which includes contractors transporting more than
10 000 tons. About 17 percent of the sample contractors have no educational
qualifications. Thirty-nine percent achieved a grade 8 or less, while 38 percent of
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· respondents have educational levels ranging from grade 9 to 12. Only six percent have a
tertiary education.
Table 3.3: Characteristics of Sample Small-scale Sugarcane Contractors in 11 Areas
of KZN, 2002/03 (n=124)
Characteristic Education Distribution
Age in Years (mean) 52.4 No Education (%) 17.1
Experience in Years (mean) 9.9 Grade 8 or less (%) 39.0
Proportion of Females (%) 13.1 Grade 9-11 (%) 18.7
Other Sources of Income (%) 77.4 Grade 12 (%) 19.5
Other Skills (%) 53.2 Tertiary (%) 5.7
Tons Transported Annually 6295.2
Tons Transported Annually* 4756.6
*Excludmg those contractors transportmg more than 10 000 tons.
Note: Contractors transporting more than 10 000 tons only influenced the tonnage mean and are therefore
included in calculating all other characteristic means.
It is important to distinguish between the infield loading methods as very different
methods of loading are used, which may markedly affect a contractor's profitability or
service quality as perceived by SSGs with respect to time and cost. Table 3.4 firstly
shows the proportions of loading types in each mill area . "Tons stacked" is a method of
cutting and stacking sugarcane by hand into piles of sugarcane that are pulled by and onto
self-loading trailers . "Tons windrowed or mechanically loaded" refers to the method
whereby sugarcane is cut and laid in rows so as to allow sugarcane loaders to pick up the
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sugarcane and place it onto trailers (normally box-type trailers). "Tons hand-loaded"
refers to cutting and loading of sugarcane directly onto trailers left in the fields. These
trailers are then carted to the loading zones or mills when fully loaded. Mill areas that
have contractors predominantly cutting and loading stacks are Maidstone, Eston, Sezela,
Felixton, Amatikulu, and Gledhow. Mill areas where the bulk of sugarcane is windrowed
or mechanically loaded include Umzimkulu, Pongola, and Noodsberg. At Entumeni most
sugarcane is hand-loaded.
Direct haulage refers to the haulage of sugarcane from fields to mills, while indirect
haulage refers to sugarcane haulage from fields to loading zones. Table 3.4 also shows
the different haulage types per mill area. Only two mill areas have the bulk of their cane
directly hauled, namely Noodsberg and Entumeni. The remaining mill areas use
predominantly indirect haulage methods. Overall, 56 percent of sugarcane transported by
respondents is stacked and 87 percent is indirectly hauled.
Table 3.5 shows the total number of tractors, trucks, trailers, and loaders owned by
contractors in the sample. Two contractors did not respond to this question, thus the
average number of vehicles or machines owned is calculated for 112 contractors. The
ratio of tractors to trailers is expected to be less than one but is in fact equal to one, as
there may be a large number of unreliable tractors which necessitate employment of
standby tractors.
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Table 3.4: Sample Small-scale Sugarcane Contractor Infield Loading and Haulage Methods, 2002/03, n=114
Tons Tons Tons Tons Sample Population
Windrowedl Hand- Directly Indirectly Total, Tons Total, Tons
Mech. Load Loaded Hauled Hauled (2002/2003) (2001/2002)*
4600 11 1 850 I 18432 11 20282 I 199040
(23%) (9%) (91%)
36 194 11 38 194


















































































































Source: Illovo Sugar Ltd. and Tongaat-Hulett Group representatives, 2002.
*Information for Umfolozi area unavailable.
**Potentiallyan incorrect population figure (reason unknown) .
Note: Figures in parenthesis denote percent out of total sample tonnage.
Table 3.5: Number of Machinery Items Owned by Sample Contractors, 2002/03
(n=112)
Machinery Type Tractors Trucks Trailers Loaders
Total Number 183 10 180 37
Machine to 1.63 0.09 1.61 0.33
Contractor Ratio
Case studies to get the views of contractors, sub-committee (locally organised groups of
SSGs in small-scale sugarcane growing areas) members and development officers on
institutional issues were conducted in eight small-scale grower areas. The areas are
distributed over KwaZulu-Natal coastal and inland regions, including four Illovo mill
areas (Eston, Sezela, Gledhow, and Glendale) and four Tongaat-Hulett mill areas
(Amatikulu, Maidstone, Entumeni, and Felixton). Included in the interviews were
contractors, sub-committee members and development officers. Case study interviews,
both in person and by phone, were conducted between September 2002 and February
2004. The main questions asked during these interviews are listed in Appendix 3.
Furthermore, due to the informal nature of the interviews, further insight was gained
through informative discussions beyond the confines of the set questions.
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3.2 Institutions Influencing Small-scale Contractor Entry"
In each study area, contractors enter the industry by way of similar methods. Differences
in contractor entry do occur across areas, but the following sections highlight the
common channels. Authorities and influential bodies within the industry (sub-
committees, local associations, milling companies) do not formally recognize contractors
who source work through channels that do not involve the sub-committees and local
associations. However, only 41 percent of sample contractors had either sub-committees
or local associations involved in their hiring. Fifty-three percent indicated grower
involvement alone, while six percent of the sample contractors indicated both grower and
sub-committee/local association involvement. This indicates that 53 percent of
contractors do not view sub-committee and local association involvement in contractual
matters, such as the signing of contracts/cessions, as significant as grower involvement,
even though sub-committees allocate the tonnages for haulage by contractors. In some
areas the sub-committee has no involvement in the signing of cessions although cessions
still need to pass through sub-committees to local associations or milling companies.
Organisational structure influences the extent to which channels through which potential
contractors enter the industry are formed. The organisations in the small-scale grower
sector differ from those found in the commercial farming sector (discussed in section
1.2). The following sections present the organisations governing small-scale growers and
contractors in greater detail.
6 Section 3.2 includes information from sample survey and case study observations. Referencing is
excluded from the text due to many individuals providing similar information.
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3.2.1 The local association
Formation
Local associations represent the interests of all SSGs in their local mill areas and
comprise of members from the numerous local sub-committees (one to two members are
voted onto the local association from each sub-committee, depending on its size). The
development of a local association often depends on the area's tribal structure (e.g.
Felixton, Gledhow, and Glendale) where each local association is representative of a
single chiefs area. This is done to minimise conflicts between different tribal members.
Furthermore, two members.of the local association are elected to sit on the MCC. In
areas where less emphasis is placed on the local association, chairmen from most sub-
committees may be elected directly onto the MCC (e.g. Sezela). There are approximately
six or seven sub-committees per local association, depending on the size of the area over
which the local association presides.
General function
Local associations oversee the functioning of sub-committees with limited authority (i.e.
ensure cane haulage and allocation operations run correctly), the extent of which depends
on the MCC. When problems arise that the sub-committee cannot solve (e.g. allocation
conflicts between growers and contractors), local associations will take over the
mediator's role in resolving the conflict. In areas where local associations are divided
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according to tribal structures, all dealings with the tribal authorities are done through the
local associations.
Role in contractor registration and setting charge-rate guidelines
Local associations are recognised by the industry as authoritative bodies and it is
compulsory for contractors to register with them (Harding, 2003). Although direct
contact with contractors is limited, the associations will receive applications from
contractors for registration purposes. The associations will then need to register them,
after which the contractors become part of the local association (most contractors are
already registered as SSGs). Registration aids payment whereby contractors are given
contractor numbers that are used to identify the contractors responsible for hauling every
load of SSG sugarcane. The contractor numbers are forwarded to the respective mills
that pay accordingly (i.e. each SSGs load sent to the mill includes his contractor's
number; the contractor is then paid by the mill out of the SSG's proceeds). The local
association also provides contractors with charge-rate guidelines for hauling SSG
sugarcane. They are assisted in this matter by milling companies and regional
economists. Rates are not set according to supply and demand for contractor services,
but are estimates (not dependent on contractor costs). In some areas rates are merely




Sub-committees are locally organised groups of SSGs in each grower area. The election
of sub-committee members, held every one to three years, are initiated and overseen by
various bodies (e.g. South African Sugar Association Experiment Station (SASEX),
South African Cane Growers' Association (SACGA), the KwaZulu-Natal Department of
Agriculture and Environmental Affairs, Mill Cane Committees, milling companies, and
development officers provided by the local associations), depending on the region. All
SSGs in their respective sub-committee areas are invited to nominate candidates and to
cast confidential ballots to elect sub-committee members (for some areas only 30 to 50
percent of SSGs are said to attend the electoral meetings). Five to nine members are
elected per sub-committee (often past members are re-elected), including a chairman and
vice-chairman who are normally appointed to the local association. It should be noted
that due to most contractors being SSGs themselves, they are not excluded from sub-
committee nomination.
General function
Sub-committees communicate grievances from SSGs to those of higher influence when
resolution is beyond the sub-committee's control or ability, i.e. involvement in settling
disputes. Information, e.g. new industry developments such as harvesting improvements
or new cane varieties, a change in sucrose or recoverable value price, also filters down
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from higher authorities (South African Sugar Association (SASA), the local grower
council) to SSGs via the sub-committees. They also channel information from SSGs to
local associations, which then forward the information to the mill cane committees
(MCCs) who in turn communicate it to the local grower councils. The MCC is the main
representative of growers in an area, and its function varies from area to area (e.g. the
Gledhow MCC directs most resources (development officer extension) in cane
development).
Role ill sugarcane allocation to contractors
The first responsibility of the sub-committee is to ensure that contractors entering the
industry have the necessary equipment (tractors, trailers), and that there is available
tonnage to haul. They also need to ensure that contractors operating in their area are
registered with the local association. Secondly, they act on behalf of all SSGs in the area,
and will allocate contractors to individual SSGs (the number of SSGs greatly exceeds the
number of contractors) . A facilitator, appointed in each sub-committee, is the individual
who takes charge in the allocation of work. The sub-committee also mediates cession
forms signed by SSGs and contractors. Following the signing of cessions, the sub-
committees will send them to the mill or local association. In 2003, SACGA and
Tongaat-Huletts began a programme in the Maidstone area whereby the Regional Cane
Delivery Forum (RCDF) adopted the function of SSG cane allocation to contractors,
previously administered by sub-committees. The Maidstone RCDF includes SSG,
contractor and Sukumani Management (subsidiary of Tongaat-Huletts Sugar)
49
representatives. The RCDF has a code of conduct to be followed by all contractors
operating in the area. Many sub-committees do not have a code of conduct, so poor-
performing contractors continue to be a part of the local associations.
3.2.3 The contractor's role in sourcing work
Wiseman (2003) states that most contractors (many being SSGs) become contractors for
two main reasons, namely to diversify, and because of the existence of low quality
contractor services (untimely haulage operations), which causes frustration for growers
relying on them. Although different mill areas use slightly different methods, the basic
steps taken by potential contractors to be recognised and receive work are as follows.
Firstly, potential contractors need to approach the sub-committee to which they want to
be affiliated (in some areas, local associations are approached first). This would
normally be a sub-committee in their own communities, but contractors have also been
found operating in other areas. These are normally close, or adjacent, to their own areas.
At this stage, the sub-committee checks a contractor's machinery and available tonnage is
totalled to see if work is available. Sub-committees expect potential contractors to
purchase machinery only after the acceptance of their applications to do contract work.
However, this rarely occurs, and contractors normally purchase their machinery before
any consultation with the sub-committee is made in the hope of getting contract work.
Once potential contractors are recognised by their sub-committees (through word of
mouth) they need to register as contractors and get a contractor number (this finalises
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registration of the contractor with the local association). This is done through the local
association in conjunction with the milling company. The milling company will then use
the numbers to identify those contractors hauling sugarcane to the mills or zones for each
grower. Registered contractors will be allocated SSGs to haul for, and both parties will
sign cessions (the cessions remain binding for a single season and signing of cessions re-
occur every year even if the grower uses the same contractor). This normally occurs at
least once a month (as found in the Sezela area), but varies according to the preference of
the sub-committee. The signing of cessions can re-occur randomly for some SSGs when
their contractors have breakdowns and haulage has to be reallocated. Some mill areas
have alternatives to cessions - for example, at the Gledhow mill, cessions are not
required, as contractors and corresponding SSGs are entered directly onto computer.
Once a contractor has work (this is allocated by the sub-committee) he is expected to
complete that to which he has agreed. Work, however, is not always completed due to
reasons both beyond (e.g. rain delays and mill breakdowns) and within (e.g. equipment
downtime) the control of the contractor. When contractors have completed their allotted
work, they receive a guaranteed payment from the milling company in the form of a
deduction from the SSG's proceeds.
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3.3 Customary Institutions Influencing Small-Scale Sugar Farming in KwaZulu-
Natal
Customary law and tradition have great influence on the "rules of the game" in the small-
scale sugarcane industry sector. Firstly, the origin of many small-scale sugar industry
problems is believed to be the land tenure situation in tribal areas of KZN (Wynne ,
2003). The SSGs need to employ contractors because it is not feasible to invest in the
necessary t~actors or machinery, due to the small size of their farms. The small farm size
is the product of tribal land being allocated to those people in the area without extending
secure tenure rights. Land purchase or rental markets therefore are imperfect for rural
area land-users. This places a restriction on, for instance, more productive SSGs because
they cannot rent in or purchase land. Thus, SSGs remain small despite the associated
constraints , such as diseconomies of size. Also, much land lies idle and uncultivated,
which is the result of an imperfect rental market (Fenwick & Lyne, 1999). Many SSGs
are exiting the sugar industry (Wiseman, 2003), and the voluntary rental of their land to
other, more productive SSGs may consolidate land in SSG areas and promote their long-
run viability.
A further problem associated with the lack of land rights is the inability of landowners to
use their land as collateral for loans because tribal owned land cannot be repossessed or
sold (Fenwick & Lyne, 1998). Land would only have collateral value under a sale
market or long-term lease market. Furthermore, title-deeds do not solve the land tenure
problem except when they assist market transfers (Fenwick & Lyne, 1999). With the
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land issue being of great importance, it remains an issue lying beyond the control of those
directly involved in the sugar industry, namely the milling companies, SASA, and
SACGA. Although involvement by sugar industry players is necessary, overall
responsibility rests with both the government and tribal authorities, highlighting a need
for institutional change (tribal land market institutions) that could promote the viability of
small-scale contractors beyond the "confines" of the sugar industry.
Thomson (1996) highlights potential steps in addressing the land tenure problem. These
are (1) to gain support from the tribal authority by communicating potential advantages
of a land market; (2) to identify what market constraints exist and then address each of
these individually, i.e. insecure tenure, risk perceptions, or a combination of both; (3) to
adapt local institutions to strengthen tenure security and provide extension to facilitate
land transactions, helping to reduce transaction costs faced by lessors and lessees; and (4)
to provide institutional support in the form of monitoring the growth of the rental market
and disputes between vested interest groups. Thomson also states that traditional
councillors must agree to uphold rental contractors and that clear procedures be
established for dispute settlement in traditional courts. This type of legal precedent
removes risk, and would therefore improve tenure security and lower transaction costs.
Another impact of customary law is the method of settling disagreements. The sample of
contractors suggests that only 36 percent settle disagreements privately, while 61 percent
indicate that some form of group settlement is necessary (i.e. through sub-committees,
associations, mill extension). Individuals are often either afraid, or do not have the status
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or authority within their community, to state their grievances with effect. For example,
Bruce (1989) indicates that over diverse cultural settings, women, specifically widowed
or single women, have a substantially lower social status than men. Wiseman (2003)
confirms this for KZN by adding that, due to tradition, societies in the rural areas of KZN
are patriarchal in nature. It is therefore expected that women would face greater legal
uncertainty and thus higher transaction costs. Lyne (1996) also identifies this issue,
stating that individuals having weak social status, in this case women, often face greater
legal uncertainty when compared to the rural elite.
Because contractors live in the same communities as both their growers/clients and
competitors, promoting a competitive industry may prove difficult. This has also greatly
influenced work allocation by sub-committees, as some have indicated that their work
allocation is not dependent on the service quality of a contractor, but rather on work
allocation equality for contractors from the sub-committee's perspective. Due to the
influence that traditional authorities (chiefs, elders) have in the small-scale sugarcane
areas of KZN, it may be prudent that these authorities be included in any institutional
change process. Thomson (1996: 83) found the inclusion of credible leaders, such as
chiefs and tribal councils, extremely important in bringing institutional change to the
tribal areas. Good leaders may play important roles in upholding contractual obligations
and enforcing land rights where government intervention may fail (enforcement in
remote areas may be difficult for government officials due to a lack of personnel and
legal infrastructure, such as rural courts).
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The next chapter presents factors inhibiting contractor performance in the small-scale
sugar industry. Examining organisational structures, contractor work sourcing channels,




FACTORS INHIBITING SMALL-SCALE CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE IN
KWAZULU-NATAL
Institutions of the small-scale sugar industry influence an individual contractor's
exchange and production costs by giving some structure to their interaction with SSGs,
competitors, and authoritative bodies such as sub-committees and local associations. The
following are factors that constrain contractor performance in the industry. Coming from
both the sample survey and case studies, factors are not ranked and are therefore not
listed in any specific order.
4.1 High Transaction Costs
Observations show that ex ante transaction costs faced by contractors, with respect to
sourcing contract work, are high. The involvement of both sub-committees and local
associations leave contractors with much "red tape" and costs to manage (negotiation
costs that include application for membership, approval and contract arrangements) over
and above those faced by commercial contractors. Furthermore, due to the small size of
growers, contractors need to find approval for many cessions, which adds to their
transaction costs (sample average was 121 SSGs per contractor). Nevertheless, there are
savings for contractors as they are assigned SSGs/clients, and therefore do not have to
search for them. The risk of losing haulage work is also relatively high for contractors
(even though 60-70 percent are normally assigned into the next year), as work allocated
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in one year is not necessarily allocated in the next. This not only creates uncertainty
regarding work for the future, but also limits access to current loans, as lending
institutions generally view contractors as short-term, and therefore high-risk clients that
cannot service long-term debt. Contractors have also mentioned the decreased amount of
work allocated over recent years. This may be attributed to the recent drought, although,
as with preceding drops in allocation, it could be the joint result of a declining number of
SSGs and an over-supply of contractors (more contractors than would survive in a free
market, where contractors have enough haulage work to make use of economies of size,
allowing for competitive charge-rates). Ex post transaction costs are increased through
the risk of contract default in the presence of legal uncertainty, especially for female
farmers and contractors.
A New Institutional Economics approach endeavours to reduce transaction costs faced by
contractors through institutional reform and would look for incentive compliant
arrangements for improving contractor performance. This would not only involve
decreasing the number of channels through which contractors need to go in order to attain
work, but may also include provision of physical (roads) and legal (ensure similar
standards for lower status individuals) infrastructure, information and education
(Matungul et al., 2001).
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4.2 Limited Access to Medium-Term Finance
With cessions being limited to one year, formal lending institutions see contractors as
temporary entities. This is understandable, as contractors are never guaranteed work for
the following season and although commercial contractors face the same problem, their
historical records reflect performance, which is not the case for small-scale contractors.
This situation strengthens the perception of contractors as high-risk clients, since
uncertainty is heightened in the minds of lenders regarding a contractor's ability to
service medium-term debt. With contractors sourcing loans for specialised equipment
such as cane loaders and cane trailers, lending institutions doubt whether even a
movement to another agricultural sector is possible in the event of a loss of sugarcane
contracting work. Nevertheless, a good credit history may prove useful for contractors
having sourced finance in the past.
4.3 Business Cash Flow Problems
The inability to use land as collateral by SSGs operating in the tribal communities is a
major limitation to raising loans. Furthermore, for current contractors, cash flow
problems, due to payment delays, amplify an already precarious financial situation. For
example, Mkhize (2002) says that repairs done by mechanics or garages are paid for in
cash, as credit payments are seldom granted to contractors, due to their reputation as
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high-risk clients. Wiseman (2003) states that contractors may have to wait up to two
months to receive payment for their services. This causes cash flow problems,
particularly at the beginning of the cutting season. Cash flow problems may also be
attributed to injudicious financial planning, as funds should be saved from the previous
season. This problem could be alleviated, as it is believed that payment within seven
days to SSGs and therefore contractors is possible (Wiseman, 2003).
4.4 Differences in Relative Bargaining Power, and Lack of Customer (SSG) Contact
Women in rural KZN have less bargaining power than men within their communities, due
to their relatively lower social status. A large proportion of SSGs are women, while most
contractors are men. Therefore, a problem may arise in competitive markets if
contractors have greater bargaining power, which is amplified through the high SSG to
contractor ratio. Wiseman (2003) indicates that this already influences price setting, as
the stronger bargaining power of contractors also carries through to these negotiations.
Weak social status would not be limited to women, but also to men through the
traditional hierarchical system, i.e. those with more authority are chiefs, traditional
council members, elders, and long-standing community members (Berry, 1993; Fenwick
& Lyne, 1998). For example, Norton (2003) stated that an authoritative figure from an
undisclosed community posed a threat to the lives of other contractors who had entered
his area seeking to expand their contracting business. Although community members
acknowledged that the other contractors were better performers, the bulk of available
work remained with the authoritative figure due to allocations being subjective.
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Regarding grower contact, the first step formally taken by contractors is not to approach
the SSGs whom they are to serve, but rather the sub-committees. The sub-committee
may consist of one or more SSGs whom the contractor may serve, but would exclude the
majority of his customers. Throughout the entire process, from industry entry to
payment, formal contact between contractors and their customers (SSGs) is limited,
except for when cessions are signed. Customer preferences are not signalled through
these administered transactions which highlights a need for contractors to compete for
clients and thereafter provide services of higher quality (i.e. timely services, acceptable
charge-rates). It can be expected that a competitive relationship between contractors
would improve the performance or service to growers.
4.5 Limitations on Growth of Business Size
Ninety-one percent of the sample contractors said that they wanted to increase the
tonnage they transport (Table 4.1). However, 72 percent indicated that this would be
possible. Only 52 percent said that they needed more machinery to do so, which
indicates that there are other constraints on business growth, such as the work limitations
placed upon contractors through tonnage allocation. One-third of the 91 percent of
respondents who wanted to increase their tonnage transported also indicated that they
needed more machinery to do so. This indicates the low quality of machinery currently
in use by contractors. Although many contractors are hauling low tonnages, additional
tractors are needed on standby to ensure haulage continues in the event of a breakdown.
If contractors do not have the necessary replacement tractors they would have to forfeit
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the already low tonnage allocated to them to another contractor operating in their area
until they are again operational.
The administrative allocation of work by sub-committees shows immediate problems
with regard to work limitations for contractors and with no exit mechanism for inefficient
contractors, quotas are getting smaller. Furthermore, the guarantee of work, although
limited, would be a contributing factor to the lack of performance incentives and
competition. Given that machinery utilization would be a key factor for successful
contracting, the ability to expand or grow such business becomes extremely important if
size economies are to be achieved.
Table 4.1: Potential for Increased Work Tonnages of Contractors, 2002/03 (n=124)
Response Can Increase Tonnage Would Like to Need More Machinery
(%) Increase Tonnage (%) (%)
Yes 72 91 52
No 28 9 48
4.6 Lack of Competition and Performance Incentives
Institutional barriers currently inhibit competition in the small-scale sugarcane contractor
sector in KZN. One barrier is the control of work allocation exercised by sub-
committees. Work allocation not only inhibits business growth but also prevents
competition. Furthermore, charge-rate guidelines, normally followed closely by
contractors (most of whom lack own cost information), also inhibit competition.
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Wiseman (2003) states that rates are determined allowing for contractor viability, i.e . all
operating contractors , including those hauling low tonnages, regardless of actual
contractor costs or service quality. Small-scale growers are then faced with higher than
market charge-rates and in some cases charge-rates are nearly double those charged by
commercial contractors (90 percent higher in some cases). Although not to the current
degree, higher rates may be expected as small-scale contractors would face higher costs
due to hauling over inferior roads and higher transaction costs of managing numerous
small contracts. Wiseman further states that restructuring needs to take place in order to
ensure that contractors entering the industry do not exceed the number needed, i.e. the
number determined by the principle of economic survival. Some contractors are lured to
contracting for reasons of status or recognition rather than money. With competition this
would end as poor-performing businessman would be "squeezed" out.
The potential sources of a contractor's competitiveness need to be identified. Firstly,
diversification may be an option in that contractors may also offer other services (e.g.
hauling timber and water), which would improve economies of size and, therefore,
overall returns. Improved services may be a second option, such as consistently
providing a reliable haulage service. . An important benefit from contractor competition
for SSGs would be lower cost services. However, contractors are faced with a limited
customer target market, due to the high costs associated with the delivery of services
outside of their own area (high cost of transporting their tractors). This may only prove
profitable if size economies are larger than increases in transaction costs. Although under
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a fixed-price situation there is still incentive for non-price competition, this incentive falls
away when work allocations are not directly related to service quality.
4.7 A Lack of Labour
Labour shortages pose a problem for some small-scale contractors. Few labourers are
needed for machinery operations (driving tractors, cranes, cane loaders etc.), but a large
number of labourers are required for sugarcane cutting tasks (approximately one cutter
per three tons sugarcane cut/day stacked, or per six tons sugarcane cut/day windrowed,
(Nothard, 2004)). Many haulage contractors are involved in cutting sugarcane, which
allows for diversification of their business. Although only 17 percent of sample
contractors directly referred to a low availability of labour, there is a concern about the
relatively more attractive wages in the commercial sector (now paying minimum wages
of R 650 per month in lower income areas and R 800 per month in higher income areas
(Craven, 2002), that far exceed those paid by small-scale labour contractors, sometimes
as much as 58 percent higher) and the impact of the Hlv/Aids virus, which negatively
effects labour productivity. Some contractors travel up to 20 kilometres to source labour.
4.8 Poor Rural Infrastructure
Although institutions in the small-scale contractor sector encompass the "rules" by which
contractors interact, adequate physical infrastructure needs to be in place for market
forces to function effectively, i.e. with lower transaction costs (Timmer,1992; and Sahn
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& Sarris, 1994; both cited in Fenwick and Lyne, 1999). The sample survey suggests that
76 percent of contractors see the lack of infrastructure as a problem that increases not
only transaction costs (Fenwick and Lyne, 1999) but also their basic haulage costs, via
increased wear and tear on machinery and increased fuel usage. Further losses occur
through decreased access to available tonnages in secluded fields. Wiseman (2003) calls
for urgent intervention by government to improve road infrastructure in the small-scale
sugar industry. Furthermore, adding to the severe affects of poor infrastructure,
sugarcane fields in remote areas of the industry add to the costs faced by contractors.
Observation shows that fields are often inaccessible due to harsh terrain (steep slopes).
The next chapter deals with a contractor service quality model that determines which
small-scale sugarcane contractor attributes affect their service quality as perceived by
their customers (SSGs). Based on the literature reviewed and observations made, all the




A CONTRACTOR SERVICE QUALITY MODEL
The focus of this chapter is to identify those attributes of contractors that have a
significant effect on the quality of their service as perceived by SSGs (transport and
general service timeliness, meeting of daily ratable delivery requirements, low
downtimes, good staff management, and minimal disagreements on service terms). It is
in a SSG's best interest to have his/her sugarcane delivered on time without conflict with
contractors. All listed attributes impact either directly or indirectly on a SSG's service
quality received (i.e. meeting their daily ratable deliveries ensures that contractors deliver
the correct amounts of a SSG's sugarcane per day. Although this benefit accrues mostly
to the milling companies , a constant amount of cane being delivered by contractors is
expected to give SSGs peace of mind).
The Institute of Natural Resources (1998) identifies many problems that are associated
with, for example, contractor management (lack of business skills), finance (lack of
capital), and operations (inappropriate equipment). The primary focus of this chapter is
to identify those attributes of contractors that have a significant effect on the quality of
their service as perceived by SSGs. This can assist sugar industry extension services in
promoting those attributes through advice and training. Data for this study were collected
between September 2002 and July 2003 on 114 small-scale contractors, who were
randomly selected from ten sugar mill areas in KwaZulu-Natal. Contractors interviewed
were all haulage contractors who practice direct haulage (sugarcane haulage from field to
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mill), indirect haulage (sugarcane haulage from field to loading zone) or both. In
addition, data on contractor service quality were collected through interviews with each
of the sample contractor's clientls or SSGs.
5.1 Data Sources
The sample data used in this chapter are derived from the survey mentioned in chapter 3.
However, for this section the ten contractors from Umfolozi are excluded because they
were not part of the sample drawn from population lists provided for each mill area;
inclusion may have introduced bias. This gives a sample size of 114 contractors. There
are no significant changes in the characteristics of respondents as shown by a comparison
of Table 3.3 and Appendix 4.
5.2 Contractor Attributes Affecting Service Quality
It is postulated that a number of contractor attributes affect a contractor's service quality
as perceived by SSGs (transport and general service timeliness, meeting of daily ratable
delivery requirements, low downtimes, good staff management, and minimal
disagreements on service terms). These are discussed in the next sections. The
importance of these attributes was determined in discussions with industry members and
by examining past research.
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5.2.1 Owner's experience, education, and gender
Various studies have established the positive impact of an owner's experience level on
firm success (Dyke et al., 1992). Dyke et al. (1992) also highlight the positive link
between owner's experience and small firm success. They conclude that certain types of
experience are important, such as previous experience in general management and
management in the industry in which an individual is currently operating. Hence, it is
expected that the longer a contractor has operated in the sugar industry the more
experience he would have gained in the industry regarding management practices and
decision-making. Greater experience of a contractor in the sugar industry could thus
have a positive impact on firm success and therefore on a contractor's service rating.
Robinson and Sexton (1994, cited in Lee and Heck, 2001) found that higher levels of
education lead to higher success rates for new business ventures. Furthermore, they show
that education has a positive impact on business growth rates. Lee and Heck (2001)
conclude that education has a marked impact on business owners and that their
businesses are more successful in terms of financial and size-scale measurements. This
relationship is due to the link between higher education and an increasing use of
information, collected data (i.e. financial records), computer technologies, and assistance
(extension services, development officers, and other organizations). It has also been
found that education improves a businessman's decision-making ability by improving
his/her understanding of the industry environment and business changes, therefore
adjusting more rapidly and accurately to them (Huffman, 1974). Bates (1990) shows that
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higher educated entrepreneurs remam m operation for longer than lower educated
entrepreneurs. Welch (1978) makes the additional point that educated people face lower
information costs because they are better able to assemble and interpret information. A
higher level of education is hypothesised as being important in a contractor's role as a
decision-maker and would, therefore, have a positive impact on his service quality.
Muntemba and Blackden (2001) show that females in Sub-Saharan Africa have limited
access to and control of assets and other resources such as land, technology, financial
services and labour, compared to males. Some of these assets or resources (labour,
financial services) are critical in the running of a sugar industry contractor business.
LYTIe (1996) states that an individual having weak social status often faces greater legal
uncertainty when compared to the rural elite. Bruce (1989) indicates that widowed or
single women have a substantially lower social status than men in LDC's. It is therefore
expected that women, probably facing higher transaction costs (limited access to
resources such finance, technology, and labour, and having a lower social standing)
because they face greater legal uncertainty, would be perceived as contractors providing a
service of lower quality.
5.2.2 Contractor business record keeping
Woodburn et al. (1994) reported that commercial farmers in KwaZulu-Natal regard their
own farm records as the most important source of information for production, marketing,
and financial decisions. However, they also found that own farm record-keeping and
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budget preparation were the most time-consuming information gathering activities. Penn
et al. (1989) maintain that record management concerns the management of information
and that businesses operating in both the public and private sectors need this information
to make decisions. They argue that if this type of information is either mismanaged or
not available, organizations may cease to exist. The sample indicates that contractors
only keep between two and three types of records (mainly records on tons transported and
labour costs), which are inadequate - either receipts only or poorly organized
documentation. This may negatively affect their quality of service. Availability of easily
accessible and up-to-date financial records would be information the contractor could use
in, for example, financial planning.
5.2.3 External information sources
The link between information, decisions, and firm performance has been well established
(Ford & Babb, 1989). The process of making production and management decisions in
agriculture by evaluating and using information has been studied for more than 80 years
(Boone et al., 2000, cited in Tucker & Napier, 2002). Information has been identified as
a significant business input, having a positive effect on production (Muller, 1974).
Farmers are likely to pay for more information as long as the expected marginal benefits
exceed the extra costs. Considering that only 59 percent of small-scale contractors had
information on labour costs, while only 71 percent had any records, external sources of
information are important. The contractors were requested to rank their three most
important information sources used (see Table 5.1).
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Seventy-eight out of 97 responding contractors (80 percent) rank milling companies as
their most important source of information. Out of 94 respondents, 29 percent and 21
percent, respectively, ranked local associations and the Ingede, a magazine published by
the South African Sugar Association, as their second most important source of
information, while 36 percent of respondents indicated the Ingede and SASEX as their
third most important sources of information.
Table 5.1: Frequency of Important Information Sources as Ranked by Sample
Contractors, 2002/03 (n = 114)
*The South African Sugar Association Experiment Station.
Information Most Second Most Third Most
Source Important Important Important
Milling Company 78 6 3
Local Association 6 27 6
The Ingede 0 20 16
SASEX* 3 10 16
Other Contractors 4 14 11
Radio 1 5 11
Others (14 sources) 5 12 28
Total 97** 94 91
. .
**Seventeen missing cases.
It has been found that there is increased success with information provision, if
information is targeted towards a specific need (Tucker & Napier, 2002). A similar
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situation may be evident in the small-scale contractor sector, which varies with respect to
operation types (i.e. indirect versus direct haulage). In this study a positive relationship is
hypothesised between the use of more important information sources and the quality of
service provided by contractors. The more relevant the information to a contractor, the
more aware he will be with regard to quality service requirements . The type of
information would relate directly to running the contractor business, e.g. new methods of
haulage and changes in haulage rates.
5.2.4 Contractor training
Hussain et al. (1994) found that more extension contact through a training and visiting
extension programme in Pakistan increased a farmer's technical knowledge and induced
earlier adoption of technology (chemical weed control). Brush et al. (1997) found that
participation in training for agrichemical use is positively dependent on problem
recognition or recognition of a need or desire. Recognition of training needs, specifically
linked to numeracy, bookkeeping and marketing, have in the past been highlighted by
small-scale growers (Eweg, 2002a). Although there is currently no distinct programme
aimed at assisting contractors, most contractors are themselves growers and have
therefore benefited from relevant grower training programmes like those offered by Joint
Venture Extension provided in partnership by SASEX and the KwaZulu-Natal
Department of Agriculture and Environmental Affairs. It is expected that increased
training of contractors would improve their service quality. Training received by
respondents is presented in Table 5.2.
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Table 5.2: Training Received by Sample Small-scale Sugarcane Contractors,
2002/03 (n=112)
*Percent of contractors that had any type of trammg, i.e. at least one of the five listed types .
Training FinanciallBook Mechanical Mechanical Implement Any
Planning
Type Keeping Servicing Repairs Setting Type
Trained
15.5 26.8 15.5 10.7 11.6 34.8*
(%)
. .
5.2.5 Machinery repairs and maintenance (R&M)
Morris (1988: 433) defines repair and maintenance (R&M) costs as "those expenditures
necessary to restore or maintain the technical soundness and reliability of the machine
following wear and tear, random failure, and accidents." Repair costs differ not only
between machine types but also between owners due to different management policies
and operator skills; furthermore, repair costs tend to increase with an increase in hours of
machine use (Iowa State University Extension, 2001a). Small-scale sugarcane
contractors generally own old machinery and thus are expected to have both high
downtimes and repair costs.
The unreliability of small-scale sugarcane contractors is a problem (Sokhela, 1999) and is
often the result of machinery downtime. Cut sugarcane is left rotting in fields with high
losses in Recoverable Value (RV) occurring for SSGs. Contractors need to deliver cut
7 Recoverable Value (RV) is a measure of cane quality including sucrose, fibre, and other non-sucrose
content (Bamber, 2002).
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sugarcane within 48 hours to ensure no significant drop in RV (Stranack, 2002). Sokhela
(1999) also reported that 50 percent of grower respondents in his study viewed
contractors as being unreliable. In the present study, 31 of the 114 contractor respondents
(27 percent) expressed their concerns about breakdowns and repair problems, while
another 12 percent had similar concerns but had solved these by, for example, using
savings to pay for repairs, giving the remaining work to other contractors or asking for
their help, repairing their own machinery, receiving assistance from local garages, having
standby tractors and trailers, or getting a mechanic to assist. However, it has been stated
by individuals that assistance was often too slow or too expensive (Mkhize, 2002;
Njapha, 2002). The survey revealed that 61 percent of respondents did not comment on
problems concerning infield loading or haulage, probably because there are no problems
or simply due to apathy in response to the questions. It is hypothesised that better access
to repair and service facilities, both internal (carrying own spares) and external
(workshops, garages, dealers), would improve a contractor's service quality via reduced
downtime. Improved access may entail external service facilities being closely situated
to contractor areas, or having quick access to spares on hand.
5.2.6 Increased tonnage transported
An increase in the tonnage contractors' transport is extremely important from a size
economies perspective. Hallam (1991: 157) defines returns to size as "the change in
output relative to costs for variations along the expansion path (cost minimising input
combinations) where the input price ratio is held constant." For a contractor, economies
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of size are experienced when an increase in the output or tonnage transported reduces
fixed costs per ton. In section 2.2.4 the benefits of both size and scale economies are
discussed in greater detail under "Improved scale and size economies".
5.3 Specification of a Contractor Service Quality Model
An empirical regression model (Gujarati, 1995) is formulated to include variables that
may influence a contractor's service quality (rating) as perceived by SSGs. Service
rating (SERV) is a score made up of six different service qualities and functions that
contractors (not sample contractors) and growers interviewed perceived were important.
Qualities and functions of contractors hypothesised as being important were listed
through an interview with a local commercial contractor (Lusso, 2002). The service
qualities were then finalized through an interview with several contractors and growers
from the Umbumbulu small-scale grower area situated near the Eston Mill in KwaZulu-
Natal (see Appendix lB for the questionnaire used).
The first service quality regarded as important by respondents is the relative time taken to
transport cut sugarcane to either loading zones (for indirect haulage contractors) or mills
(for direct haulage contractors). A second quality is the overall capability of contractors
to ensure that cane is cut, carted and delivered to mills within three days. Another is the
ability of a contractor to meet his daily ratable delivery, the agreed upon amount of
sugarcane that a contractor is required to deliver per day to ensure a steady flow of cane
to mills (this would also give SSGs peace of mind regarding a predictable/reliable
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service). The fourth service quality deals with the ownership of low downtime
machinery, which would ensure that cut sugarcane is not left rotting in the fields. A
further quality is staff management and the corresponding level of performance. The last
quality includes a rating of client conflict or level of disagreement regarding service
provision. Each quality is assumed to carry the same weight, as there is no basis to
weight some service qualities differently, e.g. management, client conflicts. Information
on contractor service quality was then collected through interviews with each of the
sample contractor's client/s or SSGs. Each contractor had either one or two SSGs
answering questions on the level of service quality they had provided (e.g. whether the
contractor moved the SSG's sugarcane quickly to loading zones or mills). Growers were
asked to rank contractors via a score for each of the six qualities ranging from one
(poorly rated) to four (highly rated). These were totalled, giving contractors an overall
score within the range of six to 24. The frequency of SERV broken down into the six
qualities is shown in Table 5.3
Due to a lack of information on grower per contractor populations, interviewers (Joint
Venture and milling company extension staff) were asked to randomly select one to two
growers per sample contractor to answer questions regarding the quality of the
contractor's service provision. Random sample selection of SSGs per contractor is
difficult as contractors are often allocated to SSGs during the season, from month to
month, at the discretion of the sub-committee. Fifty-five percent of sample contractors
received evaluations from two growers while 45 percent of contractors each received one
evaluation. With six questions asked per questionnaire, a comparison was made between
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the two questionnaires completed for the same contractor. Results of this comparison
show that 67.5 percent of the questions had the same rating, while 30.3 percent were
rated by a difference of only one point. Only 2.2 percent of the questions had
significantly different ratings (i.e. a difference of two or more points). Furthermore, 82
percent of the totals had a difference of two or less points , which indicates that SSGs had
very similar views of their contractor's service quality. In conclusion, it is assumed that
SSGs gave adequate ratings regarding their contractor's service quality.
Table 5.3: Frequency of SERV (Service Quality) Questions as Ranked by SSGs,
2002/03 (n=114)
Strongly Strongly
Service Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
Quality (%) (%) (%) (%)
Moves cane quickly to
10.4 11.3 49.6 28.8
mill/loading zone
Ensures cane is cut, carted and
8.6 17.6 50.9 23.0
delivered within 3 days
Meets daily ratable delivery
3.2 27.9 47.3 21.6
(DRD) requirements
Machinery does not often break
6.3 24.8 38.3 30.6
down
Is a good manager of his staff
1.8 22.7 50.5 25.0
Seldom has disagreements with
2.7 18.6 57.7 20.9
clients
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The hypothetical model postulated for a contractor's service rating as perceived by
growers is as follows:
SERV = j(EXP, EDUC, GENDER, TRAIN, RECORDS, FCSINF08, GENINF0
8
,
EXMACHMGT9, INMACHMGT9, LNSIZE). (5.1)
Table 5.4 presents these variables with their definitions and expected relationships with
SERV. The EXP variable is expected to have a positive sign in that more experienced
contractors are expected to be more knowledgeable of business issues and understanding
customer needs, therefore increasing their service quality. The level of a contractor's
education, EDUC, is quantified as follows: 1 for no formal education, 2 for grade 8 or
less, 3 for grades 9 to 11, 4 for grade 12 (matriculation pass), and 5 for a tertiary
education. EDUC is also expected to have a positive sign due to education benefits
linked to business practices such as bookkeeping and record-keeping. However, there
was no significant correlation between EDUC and RECORDS which may indicate that
the education benefits may be linked to other positive factors such as decision making
and understanding of business operations. GENDER is expected to have a positive sign
as females probably face higher transaction costs (limited access to resources such
finance, technology, and labour, and having a lower social standing) due to greater legal
uncertainty with respect to conflict resolution.
8 External information sources.
9 Relates to the ability to maintain and repair machinery.
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EXP Contracting experience in the sugar industry (years). +
Level of contractor education (ordinal, 1=no education;
EDUC +
5=tertiary education).
GENDER Gender of contractor (male=1; O=female). +
Level of training received by contractor (ordinal, O=none;
TRAIN +
5=high).
Level of records kept by contractor (ordinal, O=none;
RECORDS +
6=high).
Focused information sources used by contractor (highly
FCSINFO +
rated source=I; O=otherwise).
General information sources used by contractor (highly
GENINFO -
rated source =I ; O=otherwise).
EXMACMG External machinery management ability. +
INMACMG Internal machinery management ability. +
LNSIZE Natural log of tons hauled by a contractor/annum. +
TRAIN is a score ranging from 0 to 5 (a value of one unit added for each additional
training type received) that includes five types of training, namely training in financial
management, in mechanical servicing, in mechanical repairs, in implement setting, and in
planning ahead or business foresight (e.g. budgeting, machinery replacement cycles,
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profit targeting). Each training type is given equal weighting within the TRAIN score as
there is no obvious reason to attach different weightings. The more training a contractor
has (e.g. in machinery management, financial management, customer focus) , the higher
his ability to deliver a better service to his clients. RECORDS is a score for record-
keeping consisting of six types of records , namely records on hours worked, distances
travelled, fuel and oil usage, maintenance and repairs , tons transported, and labour costs.
RECORDS has a range of 0 to 6 with each record keeping type contributing a value of
one to the score. Keeping records provides valuable information and assists in
management practices. RECORDS is therefore expected to have a positive influence on
the service rating of contractors.
FCSINFO includes those information sources that are geared towards, or focused on, the
sugar industry. A total of 16 focused information sources are known to be available'",
such as: SASEX (INFOSASE), milling companies (INFOMILL), the South African
Sugar Association (SASA), the South African Cane Growers ' Association (SACGA),
various sugar industry extension services, other contractors (INFOCONT) or farmers,
local associations (INFOLOA), and sugar industry literature (e.g. the Ingede
(INFOINGE) and The Link). A 1 is allocated if a contractor rated any of the listed
information sources as one of his top three sources , and 0 otherwise. FCSINFO is
expected to have a positive influence on SERV as this type of information source is
expected to be up-to-date and relevant concerning sugar industry issues and advice (e.g.
information on sugarcane industry technologies such as new trailers or loading methods).
10 There may be other focused sources of information available ; however, these were unknown to the
author.
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GENINFO are other information sources not involved directly with information linked to
the sugar industry. It includes information from the radio (INFORADI), television,
newspapers, and machinery agents. Again, a I is allocated if a contractor rated the use of
a general information source as one of his top three sources, and 0 otherwise. A negative
sign is expected for GENINFO because contractors who rely on this type of information
source are not expected to be accessing relevant information and would therefore not be
taking advantage of information more useful to their contracting businesses. Out of both
the focused and general information sources a total of three information sources are
ranked by respondents.
Of the 20 information sources considered, 14 were excluded from the regression as they
scored less than ten positives (scores of one). This decision was based on the lack of
variability in these variables (i.e. the average number of positives for these 14 variables
was 3.2). Thus, five information sources are included as proxies for FCSINFO
(INFOMILL, INFOCONT, INFOSASE, INFOLOA, and INFOINGE) and one
information source is included as a proxy for GENINFO (INFORADI). This does not
imply that those left out are "worse" or irrelevant sources of information but rather lower
accessed sources.
EXMACMG is the machinery management of a contractor dependent on external factors
such as the existence of local dealers or agents, close workshop facilities, readily
available compressed air, and the distance to the closest fuel supply. All these variables
influence a contractor's ability to properly maintain and manage his machinery, therefore
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minimising downtime and haulage delays. EXMACMG, which is included as a principal
component (see Appendix 6), is expected to have a positive sign in that availability of
external machinery service facilities and access to these facilities are expected to impact
positively upon the contractor's business and therefore his or her service quality.
INMACMG is a principal component (see Appendix 6) accounting for an internal
machinery management variable, namely keeping popular spares on hand (e.g. fan belts,
filters, etc.). This would allow for short-term maintenance of machinery and therefore
could reduce machinery downtime. INMACMG is also expected to have a positive sign,
as contractors who keep popular spares on hand would be better able to reduce machinery
downtime in the short-run, therefore improving their service quality. Both EXMACMG
and INMACMG are principal components that are weighted representations of the five
original machinery management variables (see Appendix 5 for a summary of Principal
Component Analysis theory). The need for these principal components arose from both a
need to reduce the number of variables in the regression and to remove the high level of
collinearity among some variables (e.g. a correlation coefficient of 0.663 between Wkshp
(existence of a workshop in the area) and Dealer).
Lastly, LNSIZE (natural log of the total tonnage transported per annum) is included as a
proxy for the business size of a contractor. A positive relationship with SERV is
expected because the contractors hauling more sugarcane, and therefore taking advantage
of economies of size, would face lower costs per ton of sugarcane transported and may
thus be able to invest in more modem and reliable machinery, thus improving their
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service rating. Also, size economies increase returns to management and therefore create
a stronger incentive to provide a good service.
5.4 Empirical Analysis and Results
This section presents the results and interpretations of the regression model (for the
reliability of the model see Appendix 7). Table 5.5 presents the OLS (Ordinary Least
Squares) regression results for the estimated model. Six coefficients were significant at
least at the ten percent level, including three information sources (lNFORADI,
INFOSASE, INFOINGE) and GENDER, TRAIN, and LNSIZE. The non-significant
coefficients include EXP, EDUC, RECORDS, EXMACMG, INMACMG and three
information sources, namely INFOMILL, INFOCONT, and INFOLOA. EDUC and
RECORDS are not correlated.
GENDER has a positive coefficient, as expected, that is significant at the five percent
level of probability. This suggests that male contractors are providing a higher quality
service as perceived by SSGs. On average, if a contractor is male he will have a 2.3-
point higher perceived service rating out of 24 than a female, ceteris paribus.
The TRAIN coefficient is significant at the five percent level of probability, and indicates
the positive impact of training on a contractor's service rating, i.e. the more training
contractors receive, the more likely they are to improve their service quality as perceived
by SSGs.
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Table 5.5: Contractor Service Quality Model
Regression Standardised t- Significance
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Statistic Level VIF
ll Definition
Constant 9.960 2.824 *** Constant
EXP 0.018 0.033 0.320 ns 1.339 Contracting experience
EDUC -0.435 -0.142 -1.413 ns 1.271 Level of education
GENDER 2.268 0.204 2.065 ** 1.231 Gender of a contractor
TRAIN 0.579 0.231 2.238 ** 1.346 Training received
RECORDS -0.082 -0.045 -0.397 ns 1.622 Level of records kept
Information from milling
INFOMILL -0.528 -0.045 -0.417 Ns 1.490
companies
INFOCONT 0.587 0.076 0.594 Ns 2.056 Information from contractors
INFORADI -1.829 -0.195 -1.728 * 1.603 Information from the radio
INFOSASE 1.924 0.243 2.139 ** 1.621 Information from SASEX
INFOLOA -0.287 -0.040 -0.343 ns 1.688 Information from the local assoc.
INFOINGE 2.037 0.279 2.188 ** 2.047 Information from the Ingede
LNSIZE 0.714 0.214 1.915 * 1.578 Log of tons transported annually
EXMACMG -0.224 -0.061 -0.617 ns 1.229 External machinery management
INMACMG 0.509 0.140 1.416 ns 1.237 Internal machinery management




Note: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and * significance at the
10% level of probability.
11 See Appendix 7 for interpretation of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF).
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Three further significant coefficients relate to information sources. SASEX
(INFOSASE) and the Ingede magazine (INFOINGE) had positive estimated coefficients.
The standardised coefficients show that INFOINGE and INFOSASE are the two most
influential variables affecting SERV. Information from the radio (INFORADI) has a
negative estimated coefficient that is significant at the ten percent level of probability.
INFORADI is a more general source of information, and so might not be a source of
incorrect information, but rather a source of lower quality less focused information. A
higher quality information source would provide more up-to-date and relevant
information useful to contractors in the management of their business. It should also be
mentioned that, although information from the mill was highly rated by most contractors ,
it lacked variation and therefore had no impact on distinguishing between high and low
quality service contractors.
LNSIZE has, as expected, a positive coefficient that is statistically significant at the ten
percent level of probability. The positive effect of LNSIZE on service quality as
perceived by SSGs may be due to the advantage that size economies would provide to
larger contractors via lower costs per ton of sugarcane transported, thus creating stronger
incentives to perform and enabling them to acquire more modem and reliable machinery.
The coefficients of EDUC and INMACMG have absolute t-statistics greater than one.
The negative coefficient for EDUC indicates a negative influence of education on service
quality. This negative relationship does not follow a priori expectations and may be due
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to EDUC not capturing the total effects of other influences, such as time constraints
linked to "out of contracting" work done by higher educated contractors. For the more
educated contractors involved in other "out of contracting" activities, the contracting
business may not be the only source of income and so less management time would be
invested in their contracting business. The contractors may therefore deliver a lower
quality service under these time constraints. Furthermore, the keeping of popular spares
on hand (INMACMG) coefficient was positive and significant at the 16.1 percent level of
probability. The result shows that internal machinery management practices may have a
positive impact on contractor's service quality rating as perceived by SSGs.
The management and policy implications of the results are discussed in more detail in the
section on "Conclusions and Policy Recommendations". The next chapter deals with the
estimation of machinery costs in the small-scale contractor sector.
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CHAPTER 6
SMALL-SCALE SUGARCANE CONTRACTOR MACHINERY COSTS AND
FINANCE
Where crop farming is concerned, farmers' demand for contracting services is primarily
determined by the level of their machinery needs, as well as the inability to purchase the
machinery themselves (Errington & Bennet, 1994). Contractors can do land preparation,
spraying, planting, harvesting, transport, and anything else that may require investments
in expensive machinery. Ball (1987: 484) states that one reason for using contractors in
modem agriculture is "the quest for adequate mechanisation levels". This also applies to
the sugar industry and for the contractors - a complete line of machinery is one of the
largest investments a contractor can make. Furthermore, machinery has to be
continuously maintained (especially second-hand machinery), monitored, and eventually
replaced. This chapter attempts to estimate depreciation for small-scale contractor
tractors and also comments on repairs and maintenance (R&M) costs, alternative loading
and haulage methods, and types and sources of machinery finance in the small-scale
contractor sector.
6.1 Machinery Cost Theory
Contractors, as all businessmen, need to know their machinery and/or labour costs linked
to the operations they perform (Eggers, 1998). Although total costs to the contractor
involve more than pure operation costs, such as additional information costs (e.g. the cost
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of gathering information on how best to use contractor machinery) and risk, the operation
costs are those with the potential to be recorded and calculated by the contractor.
Examples of costs linked to small-scale sugarcane contracting are fuel, repair and
maintenance costs, wages and depreciation on new or second-hand machinery.
6.1.1 Fixed and operating costs of machinery
The contractor costs of running machinery consist of fixed costs and operating costs .
Fixed costs include machinery accessories, interest on capital borrowed to buy the
machinery, insurance and depreciation (Booysen & de Beer, 1977). Further fixed costs
are the housing of machinery and opportunity costs (potential interest earned elsewhere),
if cash is used to purchase the machinery (Iowa State University Extension, 2001a). Such
costs are considered fixed in that whether the equipment is used or not they remain the
same. Booysen & de Beer (1977: 12) show the importance of using machinery and state
that "the more it (machinery) is used, the more it produces, the lower the rate of
ownership" cost of machinery per hour. A relationship between tractor fixed costs and
hours used per annum is shown in Figure 6.1.
Operating costs vary directly with the level of machinery use and are also known as
variable costs. These costs include fuel, lubrication or oil, wear-and-tear, maintenance
and repairs, and operator costs (Booysen & de Beer, 1977). If the machinery is not used ,
variable costs will be zero and so will not affect the overall costs to the contractor.
Important to consider are the fluctuations that may occur in the variable costs, such as
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changes in the fuel price or access to fuel. It is then important to consider what effect
such an event will have on the operating costs to the contractor and if any necessary
adjustments need to be made. The costs to the small-scale sugarcane contractor are
largely made up of machinery costs with a balance of labour and management costs .
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Figure 6.1: Theoretical cost of tractors per hour
(Source: Booysen & de Beer, 1977: 13)
6.1.2 Machinery replacement strategies
Work (Hours per
Annum)
To put together an adequate machinery system is difficult in that a system working well
in one year may not meet the performance needs of the next. The need for machinery
replacement may then arise. Large differences in production costs are dependent on how
and when machinery is replaced (Iowa State University Extension, 2001 b). Most
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replacement strategies are to minimise the present value for a future stream of costs
(Perrin, 1972, cited in Perry & Nixon, 1991), and have, in the past, been largely
concerned with taxes and tax policies. For example, as Reid and Bradford (1983: 326)
point out, the most important factors in the replacement of tractors are "(a) the tractor's
remaining market value, and (b) income tax incentives". However, important variables
on which little emphasis has been placed must also be considered. Perry and Nixon
(1991: 119) maintain that some of these include the "annual hours of use, annual repair
costs, and changes in repair costs and hours of downtime as equipment ages". Perry and
Nixon have further stated that additional research is needed on the effects of repair and
availability (reliability) cost relationships, on what non-monetary transaction costs exist,
and on the importance of technological change regarding replacement strategies.
6.1.3 Financing machinery purchases
In financing machinery purchases, contractors should not only compare different sources
of finance, where available (e.g. commercial banks, Ithala Bank, Umthombo Agricultural
Finance, etc.), but also compare different types of finance. Crabtree (1984) compares
four different types of finance used in machinery purchases, namely bank overdraft
facilities, term loans, hire purchasing (HP), and leasing. Machinery can also be
purchased with cash when available to the contractor. The choice is usually based on
which type of finance will eventually cost the contractor less. Overdraft, term loan, and
HP costs can be compared on an annual percentage interest rate (APR) basis. Crabtree
found bank overdraft usually to be the cheapest source in such a comparison, with HP a
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close second. However, it is further stated that this conclusion may be inconsistent over
different time periods.
6.2 Estimating Small-scale Contractor Tractor Costs
Information on small-scale contractor tractors regarding depreciation and repairs and
maintenance costs is limited because contractors do not keep adequate records. With
both types of cost being critical components needed in calculating annual average
machinery costs, their accurate estimation becomes extremely important where precise or
documented figures do not exist. From the survey (see Chapter 2) it was quickly
determined that contractors did not know their own operating costs. From the limited
data available (the sample survey data; AGFACTS (AGFACTS, 2003)) a depreciation
trend is forecast for tractors up to 24 years of age.
6.2.1 Estimated depreciation trend for small-scale contractor tractors
Although current tractor depreciation information is available for new tractors (Troy et
al., 2003), information on older tractors, i.e. those found in the small-scale sugarcane
contractor sector, is lacking. Tractor information collected in the survey included the
make/model and/or age of the tractor, engine power (kilowatts), purchase price
(nominal), purchase year and drive system (two or four wheel drive). Information on the
original purchase price (nominal) was collected from AGFACTS documentation
(AGFACTS, 2003). In estimating an average depreciation curve, at constant 2002 prices,
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information on tractor make, engine power and drive system was omitted due to a lack of
observations. Only 39 cases had information on both prices and age. Although
distinguishing between engine power and drive system is important, it was not possible
due to the low number of cases. Engine power of tractors in the 39 cases ranged between
45 and 72 kilowatts; all were two-wheel drive except one. A further problem with the
available data was that no information on the number of hours tractors are used per year
could be obtained.
Average depreciation per year for tractors of ages five to 18 are shown in Figure 6.2 and
a downward trend, as expected, is shown. This, however, is average depreciation per
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Figure 6.2: Average depreciation of tractors according to age
(2002 prices, 45-72 kilowatt tractors)
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For predictive purposes, a trend needs to be determined whereby depreciation is
calculated into the future. A semi-logarithmic function, i.e. Depreciation per Year as a
function of Age, (Dep/Yr) =jln(Age), is fitted to the data from Figure 6.2. It was found
that a logarithmic function best fits the data with an R of 80.1 percent, and a R
2
of 64.1
percent. New data are created that fit the logarithmic curve from the following function:
Dep/Yr = 61 274.037 - 19 427.5*ln(Age) (6.1)
Figure 6.3 shows that tractors beyond the age of 23 will have zero average depreciation
per year; however, in practice tractors would never have zero depreciation as depreciation
would remain at a low constant until the tractor's life has ended (Lyne, 2004). From the
graph this may be within the range of two and four thousand Rand (i.e. within the range
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Figure 6.3: Logarithmic function of average depreciation of tractors
(2002 prices, 45-72 kilowatt tractors)
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6.2.2 Estimating repairs and maintenance (R&M) costs for small-scale contractor
tractors
Concerning R&M, older tractor information was gathered by SASEX on tractors from
commercial sugarcane growers in Swaziland and the KwaZulu-Natal South Coast.
Tractors showed constant R&M costs in the later years, which is unexpected as R&M
costs are usually expected to rise as tractors age. Small-scale contractors have no records
and minimal knowledge of their R&M costs. Through observation of current
maintenance practices in the small-scale contractor sector, almost no preventative
maintenance of tractors occurs. It appears as if maintenance costs remain relatively Iow .
for some time (due to inadequate maintenance practices) but would increase
exponentially later in the tractor's life until, at some stage, it becomes unaffordable to
repair the tractor. It has been stated that many contractors exit the market once tractors
have reached this level of disrepair. Figure 6.4 provides possible R&M scenarios for
commercial and small-scale contractors.
6.3 Alternative Loading and Haulage Methods
It has been stated that a machinery system working well in one year may not necessarily
meet the performance needs in the next. It is assumed that small-scale contractors
purchase second-hand haulage tractors and use current loading and haulage methods





















Figure 6.4: Possible R&M scenarios for tractors under commercial and small-scale
conditions
x - warranty period of new tractor (commercial)
y - purchase time of second-hand tractor (small-scale)
Different haulage operations depend partly on distances to mill, and thus SSG areas
situated far from the mill would have contactors hauling indirectly, while closely situated
SSG areas would have contractors delivering sugarcane directly. As shown by Table 3.4,
differences also exist in loading methods not only between mill areas but also within mill
areas with the preferred method being the stacking of cane (56 percent). Although some
contractors state that mechanically loading sugarcane is currently the best method
available (Mkhize, 2002; Njapa, 2002), reasons for the bulk of small-scale contractors
stacking sugarcane are assumed to be (1) the high costs associated with mechanical
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loaders and their under-utilisation (Hudson, 1996), (2) the need for more than one trailer
when hand-loading if contractors want tractors to be constantly utilized, (3) the
availability of second-hand self-loading trailers, and (4) prior to the new minimum wage
labour legislation, the low cost of labour relative to machinery investments made in self-
loading trailer systems (asset specificity and irreversible investments).
From donkey-pulled carts to mechanical cutting and loading methods, small-scale
contractors may have more than one option regarding sugarcane planting, maintenance
and haulage systems. For example, small-scale sugarcane farmers in Thailand were faced
with a difficult situation where contractors refused to do their mechanical operations due
to the unprofitability of small-scale operations. Besides making tractors available for
hire, cane technologists and extension workers encouraged the use of buffalos and
walking tractors (Hudson, 1996). Although the latter methods required extra operations,
e.g. more passes regarding ploughing operations, they may have been the best or only
alternatives under the circumstances .
For small-scale sugarcane contractors, current operation options are limited; nevertheless,
future investments in better systems may be necessary. A better system may not be a
more expensive one, and given the constraints on contractors (low tonnages, high
transaction costs) a cheaper system may be preferred, although a cheaper service may
lead to a lower standard of contractor service quality, e.g. slower haulage rates. Section
4.4 states a need for improved customer contact and a change in current systems may
depend on the demand for services (e.g. haulage rates versus cost of the service). The
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system should depend on a customer's needs, rather than a contractor's view of which
systems are best.
6.4 Types and Sources of Contractor Finance
It is important for contractors to not only compare different sources of finance, but types
of finance as well. The choice is based on which is the cheapest within the confines of
availability. Table 6.1 presents the types of finance used by contractors in the small-scale
sugarcane industry for machinery purchases (vehicles and equipment). Nearly 60 percent
used cash to finance machinery purchases while 24 percent accessed loans. From Table
6.2 it is shown that, besides savings, Ithala was the most used small -scale contractor loan
source.
Table 6.1: Types of Machinery Finance for Sample Respondents, 2002/2003 (n=124)
Cash Loan Hire Purchase Inherited No Response
58.9% 24.2% 10.5% 4.0% 2.4%
Table 6.3 indicates that many contractors still plan to finance operations with cash.
About five percent were undecided between whether future machinery purchases would
be with cash or loans/hire purchase. Although Ithala remains the most popular planned
source of borrowed finance, Table 6.4 suggests a significant drop of 5.7 percentage points
for those respondents planning to use Ithala loans in future machinery acquisitions.
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Table 6.2: Sources of Machinery Finance for Sample Respondents, 2002/2003
(n=124)
Bank/Building
Savings Ithala Inheritance Society Land Bank
56.5% 24.2% 4.8% 3.2% 1.6%
Milling
Company Pension Garage Confidential No Response
1.6% 0.8% 0.8% 2.4% 4.0%
Table 6.3: Planned Types of Future Machinery Finance for Sample Respondents,
2002/2003 (n=124)
Hire Cashl Cashl Stop No
Cash Loan Purchase Loan HP Contracting Response
50.0% 26.6% 11.3% 4.0% 0.8% 4.0% 3.2%
Table 6.4: Planned Sources of Future Machinery Finance for Sample Respondents,
2002/2003 (n=124)
Not Applicable Bank/Building Milling
(e.g. Savings) Ithala Landbank Society Company
52.4% 18.5% 7.3% 4.8% 4.8%
Umthombo Other Unsure No Response
2.4% 5.7% 0.8% 3.2%
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CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Within current institutions, a service quality model highlights certain attributes of
contractors that may provide routes through which to improve contractor service
provision. The influence of contractor attributes on perceived contractor service quality
was examined using information collected from a random sample of 114 contractors
drawn from 10 mill group areas in KwaZulu-Natal alongside information sourced from
clients/SSGs concerning contractor service quality. Results from a regression model
indicate that the gender of a contractor, training received, use of information provided
from SASEX and the Ingede, and a higher tonnage throughput could improve the quality
of service as perceived by SSGs. Although there is a need for institutional reform,
training and relevant information provision may be vital tools in improving contractor
productivity within the confines of current institutional constraints.
Although contracting is not gender specific, there is evidence to support views that the
rural business environment in which contractors operate has some gender discrimination.
Female contractor performance may be constrained by higher transaction costs, resulting
in a limited control of, and access to, resources. These resources are seen as being
unequally distributed in favour of males. Policy makers need to be aware of this situation
and if necessary promote institutional reform that will help to reduce transaction costs
faced by women (e.g. endorse women as contractors to financial institutions, informing
them of successful female contractors despite the extra costs they face; and provide
separate support and advice to women dealing specifically with constraints faced by them
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through, for example, female gender rights workshops). Increased female participation in
the contracting sector may also be promoted by giving female contractors more voice and
influence in the sugar industry through their involvement in higher levels of management
(e.g. regular participation in SSG sub-committees and local associations).
Training is an important contributor to perceived contractor service quality. The
importance of training should be highlighted and organisations such as the South African
Sugar Association and milling companies need to identify the contractors' specific
training needs. This could be done through consultation with contractors as well as SSGs
in identifying training needs. Furthermore, the benefits of training need to be clearly
communicated to contractors if adoption of, for example, new management techniques
and technologies, or improved management of current operations is to take place. For
example, training needs may be linked to forward planning or promoting the contractor's
business foresight (machinery replacement cycles, cost lowering goals). A contractor
needs to know where he is going (e.g. diversify, expand), what funds he will need in
future, and where the funds will come from. Advice on what finances are available, how
best to access these finances and how to service loan repayments, needs to be made
available. Another important aspect would be the "following up" on training already
given. Prevailing institutions may, however, reduce the value of investments in training;
for example, the promotion of business expansion would be constrained by current
tonnage allocation methods.
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The results also suggest that the source of and access to information for contractors is
important. SASEX appear to provide relevant information that affects the contractor's
service quality as perceived by SSGs. Information on machinery costs, new industry
developments , customer needs, and competitors, provided by Joint Venture or mill
extension services, could make contractors more competitive by enabling them to set
their own prices and improve business methods relating to transport, staff management
and cost cutting. High quality and relevant information should, therefore, promote a
contractor's ability to provide higher quality services to SSGs.
Contractor business size, in terms of tonnage hauled, is an important factor in promoting
service quality. This is due to the nature of the contracting business and the dependence
on machinery utilization linked to economies of size. Contractors transporting higher
tonnages can spread fixed costs and reduce overall costs per ton. Increased profits create
stronger incentives to perform and may enable them to acquire more modem and reliable
machinery, leading to less downtime. The sub-committees who influence cane allocation
to contractors need to be aware of the importance of economies of size and the likely
influence it has on the service quality of contractors as perceived by growers. However,
access to contract work remains limited for better performing sugarcane contractors in
KZN due to the administrative allocation of work by sub-committees (or in the
Maidstone area, by the RCDF). These institutions remove performance incentives by
setting prices and allocating work subjectively. Small-scale growers do not have
bargaining power and so penalties for contractors regarding poor service do not exist (a
competitive market would solve this problem by eliminating poor performers). Instead of
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reducing transaction costs, current institutions, such as the administrative organisation,
mcrease costs by adding unnecessary channels through which contractors need to
proceed. Seemingly an obvious problem and widely spoken of in the small-scale
sugarcane industry, tonnage allocation remains the constraining factor on contractor
business growth. This problem gives rise to the need for institutional reform that will
promote competition.
Contractors and SSGs need to interact more in addition to the signing of cessions. This
would allow SSGs to communicate their "product value" expectations (e.g. timely
haulage expectations) to contractors. For example, a contractor's untimely haulage
operations negatively affect a grower's income via lower Recoverable Value (RV)
payments. Growers need to be able to communicate their grievances to contractors and
sanction tham through exit if performance improvements are to be promoted. SSGs
should therefore be allowed to choose their own contractors within a competitive sector
where poor service providers would have the potential for exclusion from selection.
Changes in payment terms for contractor services are necessary in that contractors need
to be more motivated to ensure that sugarcane reaches mills before RV levels drop.
Thus, payments to contractors based not only on tonnage delivered, but also on RV, may
reduce haulage delays. For example, the payment system may be based partly on RV and
partly on tonnage depending on industry requirements. However, if this payment system
were to be adopted , delivery of low quality cane by contractors would decline unless
premium prices were paid covering the extra haulage costs. Contractors may be justified
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in charging higher prices for harvesting poor cane. This may inevitably drive SSGs that
produce low quality cane from the industry, further highlighting the need for a land
(rental) market allowing high quality cane producing SSGs to rent in more land. Also,
due to contractors having limited access to finance and a high liquidity preference
(continuing operations with respect to fuel and repairs), earlier payment for their service
needs to be seriously considered by milling companies. This is possible, as information
on which contractor delivered the cane and the value of cane delivered is said to be
available well within the one to two month payment time. Less delay in haulage
payments would be highly beneficial to contractors in providing liquidity to fund day-to-
day operations. Introducing this type of payment scheme may require preliminary
adoption of a reduced payment delay (i.e. three to four weeks), with additional decreases
(i.e. two weeks) being considered for the future, so as to allow mills to accustom
themselves to quick payments (computer systems may need adjustment, and staff trained
to deal with shorter payment schedules). Although a payment system may need to be
designed for contractors, market forces would eventually decide upon charge-rates for
contractors competing for work.
Regarding a competitive contractor sector, note must be taken of the bargaining power of
contractors compared to SSGs. Policy makers must not overlook this relationship as
short-term abuse of bargaining power over SSGs may result if contractors are to be
allowed to set their own prices. In the long run, however, prices would be driven down
by competition amongst contractors, especially after the expansion of contractors and
their taking advantage of economies of size. The development of a competitive sector
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may be realisable, in that the situation already exists III Mpumalanga (Komati and
Malelane) where commercial contractors, some being SSGs themselves, are contracting
to SSGs under competitive conditions.
Before discussing potential steps in moving towards a competitive sector, it is necessary
to mention those contractors who may lose with regards to own vested interests and
power relations, i.e. those that would oppose institutional change. Firstly, many
contractors may need to exit the industry with their work being taken up by more
productive contractors (quality service providers regarding timeliness and charge-rates).
There is no indication of this number, however, with most contractors needing to more
than double haulage levels to at least 10 000 tons (to make use of economies of size and
break-even), a potential drop of 50 percent of currently operating contractors may occur.
Others with vested interests would be those in authoritative positions on local
associations and sub-committees. However, these institutions may still be useful in
providing information, for contract monitoring and/or contract enforcement. Further
costs would be faced by, for example, milling companies where computer administration
may have to change in the form of new computer programmes and staff training in order
to speed-up payments to contractors. This may, therefore, also invoke some resistance to
change.
Potential steps in moving towards a more competitive contractor sector include:
• Allow contractors to source their own work. Contractors do not have to work
through channels to get jobs beyond personal dealings with the SSGs. Also, a
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milling company payment scheme is not necessarily needed, although this option
should still be made available to parties contracting in a competitive market.
• Current extension services (joint venture and milling company) need to
communicate the benefits of competition to both SSGs and contractors (lower
charge-rates through cost cuts by contractors, improved service quality for SSGs,
ability to expand contracting business and make use of economies of size for
contractors, and freedom to choose clients).
• The authority of associations and sub-committees should be limited to the
recording and provision of information, mediation and arbitration of disputes, and
contract enforcement (this despite the vested interests of individuals within these
authoritative positions). It may also be useful to deploy sub-committees as
brokers to absorb costs associated with search and negotiation costs. As brokers
they could also record and forward information about contractors to millers if the
contractual parties wish to reduce their transaction costs by retaining the milling
companies as paymasters. Crookes (2002) gives similar recommendations,
highlighting the need for both government and extension services to assist in
reducing transaction costs linked to an arable land rental market by providing
relevant information (e.g. on legal precedents regarding contract integrity, lists of
willing market participants, advice on contractual procedures, etc.).
• Make allocated tonnages transferable between contractors at prices set by
contractors themselves. This would move current allocations to more efficient
contractors willing to pay the highest price per transfer.
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• Any support (information, extension advice) that contractors need could be
provided by extension services already in place. However, if the request for
information exceeds what can be provided, contractors may want to consult with
(paid) private experts for advice (this will promote more efficient allocation of
resources , such as information inputs, to better performing contractors).
• A short-term solution to contractors determining charge-rates may be to provide a
list of potential charge-rates or price information (by extension services) of all
contractors in an area to SSGs (this may be the sub-committee area or wider
depending on distance costs to contractors). This could drive charge-rates down,
as SSGs will likely try to source the lower cost providers.
• It needs to be clearly communicated to SSGs that contractors are service providers
and that the SSGs are their customers. There must be a demand for high quality
service in order to drive service levels up to acceptable standards (i.e. a more
competitive industry structure will improve service quality by contractors
jockeying for competitive advantage). This does not occur at present because
SSGs are allocated to contractors and therefore are not voluntary clients.
In effect, contractors who are not cost effective and/or deliver poor quality services may
exit the market leaving lower-cost contractors in the industry. However, competition
might be limited only to contractors within the same areas, as delivering such service
over a wide geographical area may prove costly for contractors.
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From a development perspective, it would take time for the remammg small-scale
contractors to reach commercial levels of competitive advantage, i.e. commercial charge-
rate levels and commercially acceptable standards of service. It may, therefore, be
necessary to protect areas where commercial contractors have access, in the short-term, to
prevent the small-scale contractor sector from collapsing (i.e. leave authority of area
allocation, not individual allocation as in the past, to sub-committees in the short-term so
that groups of contractors compete amongst themselves in their own areas).
Porter (1985) outlined a necessary approach for contractor's operating in a competitive
sector. It would be necessary for contractors to guarantee sources of key inputs (a
continuous supply of fuel for day-to-day operations, and readily available repair
services). Contractors would need to be able to compete with fellow small-scale
contractors and commercial contractors, and to deter potential new entrants by building
up a competitive advantage (e.g. ensure services are of a high standard (timely
operations) and that prices are competitive). Contractors need to be aware of an expected
increase in the bargaining power of SSGs as the SSGs ability to change contractors would
be increased in a more competitive market.
From a machinery costing perspective, the lack of information on what costs contractors
face is problematic considering that contractor costs are largely weighted by machinery
costs. If the "fruits" of training contractors in recording and calculating own machinery
costs expect to remain unrealised in the near future, immediate action may be to develop
and provide benchmark-costing information based on real data. This would involve case
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studies of small-scale contractor machinery operations, including the recording of day-to-
day operational costs (fuel, oil, R&M), haulage distances and the number of days
operating. Contractors also need to be advised on preventative maintenance and the
importance thereof in extending the life of valuable and expensive assets such as tractors.
Alternative systems used by contractors would not only depend on availability and price,
but also on the service demanded by SSGs. Furthermore, contractors may need guidance
in where and how to access finance for new machinery purchases. With Ithala being the
preferred source of loan finance, it may be useful to inform contractors of Ithala
requirements in loan approval, such as a good credit history.
The government may have a role in improving small-scale contractor performance
through a change in government policy and institutions. Firstly, government could
consider creating formal land markets under informal constraints (tribal authority) in
partnership with those directly involved in the sugar industry (SASA, milling companies,
SACGA). Following Thomson's (1996) recommended steps to address highly imperfect
rental markets may be an approach that government and others involved in the industry
could use.
Secondly, government needs to direct more funding towards improving rural
infrastructure such as roads, which would reduce haulage costs and improve
communication. Groups of SSGs (e.g. sub-committees) could invest in road maintenance
equipment (subsidisation by government may be required) and maintain infield roads for
those in their area. District road maintenance would remain the responsibility of
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government. Furthermore, extension staff may want to advise potential SSGs not to plant
sugarcane in inaccessible areas, as contractors under a competitive situation may not be
willing to haul their sugarcane.
Thirdly, government needs to ensure that tribal courts do not run a dual system of
decision but that all contracts are enforced consistently regardless of social status, i.e.
there needs to be monitoring over tribal rulings and accessible places of appeal for those
with grievances regarding these rulings. Fourthly, labour legislation should be seriously
reconsidered regarding the minimum wage bill, as many small-scale contractors simply
cannot pay the legal minimum wage (R650 or R800 per month depending on the area) to
their unskilled labour, due to their already relatively high costs of operating (high
transaction costs , diseconomies of size). Lastly, protection of those competing for work
needs to be made available. "Mafia" type behaviour and abuse of authority in communal
areas need to be severely dealt with by law enforcement officers.
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SUMMARY
This study has two main objectives. The first is to establish the current institutional
constraints that may negatively influence a small-scale sugarcane contractor's
performance and overall operation. Contractor performance would include aspects such
as timely haulage operations and cost effectiveness, bringing about lower charge-rates for
SSGs. The second objective is to identify small-scale sugarcane contractor attributes that
have a significant effect on their service quality within current institutions, as perceived
by small-scale sugarcane growers (SSGs).
The organisational structure of SSGs and their contractors is different to that found in the
commercial farming sector. Instead of SSGs being in direct contact with their local
grower councils, they operate via their respective sub-committees, local associations and
mill cane committees. Also, in many areas the sub-committees are responsible for
allocation of SSG tonnages to the contractors. This makes the SSG sector unique and
those involved in this sector, including small-scale contractors, face unique problems
(e.g. there are tonnage allocation constraints on contractors).
The main operations for which growers make use of contractors are land preparation,
sugarcane transport, planting, fertilizing and harvesting. For the SSG it makes financial
sense to make contractual arrangements with contractors who should be able to provide a
more cost effective machinery, and even labour, service. However, to date, productivity
problems with the small-scale sugarcane contractors relate to the poor timeliness of their
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operations and high charge rates reflected in the higher costs (e.g. higher transaction costs
due to institutional constraints) that the average small-scale contractor faces.
Information from case studies, conducted in eight SSG areas, and a sample survey was
used to examine current institutional constraints. The sample survey included 124
randomly selected contractors from 11 mill group areas in KwaZulu-Natal between
September 2002 and July 2003. The mill group areas included Umzimkulu , Sezela,
Eston, Maidstone, Noodsberg, Gledhow (including Glendale), Amatikulu, Entumeni,
Felixton, Pongola, and Umfolozi. The case studies were conducted between September
2002 and February 2004 in four Illovo mill areas (Eston, Sezela, Gledhow and Glendale)
and four Tongaat-Hulett mill areas (Amatikulu, Maidstone, Entumeni and Felixton).
Case studies concerning institutional issues, such as organisational structures and
functions, involved interviews with contractors, sub-committee members and
development officers. There is also a brief assessment of customary institutions having
an influence in the SSG sector, where a lack of land tenure rights and the existence of
both gender and social discrimination is highlighted.
Both survey and case study results show that contractors face many institutional
constraints such as work allocation limitations and high transaction costs. Transaction
costs include negotiation costs, the risk of a loss in work independent of performance,
and risk of contract default. Other constraints include cash flow problems, poor physical
infrastructure and a lack of labour. Other factors that are inhibiting contractor
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performance are the differences in relative bargaining power between SSGs and
contractors as well as the lack of customer (SSG) contact by contractors.
Information from the sample survey, less ten observations from Umfolozi, was used for
determining attributes affecting contractor service quality. Further interviews were
conducted in the same time period with SSGs for information on contractor service
quality (transport and general service timeliness, meeting of daily ratable delivery
requirements, low downtimes, good staff management, and minimal disagreements on
service terms).
An empirical regression model was formulated to include variables that may influence a
contractor's service quality (rating) as perceived by SSGs. Service rating (SERV) is a
score made up of six different service qualities and functions that contractors (not sample
contractors) and growers interviewed perceived were important. These were transport
and general service timeliness of contractors, the meeting of daily ratable delivery
requirements by contractors, low downtimes of contractor machinery, good staff
management by contractors, and whether minimal disagreements between SSGs and
contractors regarding service terms take place.
The model's results indicate that the gender of a contractor, training received by a
contractor, use of information provided by SASEX and the Ingede, and a higher tonnage
throughput could improve the quality of service as perceived by SSGs. Training and
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relevant information provision may be vital tools in improving contractor productivity
within the confines of current institutional constraints.
A depreciation trend for contractor tractors is estimated up to 23 years of age from data
drawn from both the sample survey and AGFACTS (Agfacts, 2003). A possible Repairs
and Maintenance (R&M) scenario is presented where a lack of maintenance has been
observed in the small-scale contractor sector. It is concluded that there is a need for
further research on the issue of contractor machinery costs. In a competitive sector
contractors would need to have adequate information on own costs in order to compare
these with contract rates in the market.
Current and future sources of contractor finance are examined. Although the majority of
contractors use cash to finance machinery purchases, Ithala Bank is the most common
source of loan finance. Further guidance by extension staff and other industry advisors
(e.g. development officers) in the accessing of adequate finance may be necessary,
particularly in the areas of "where" and "how" to access finance. This would include
loan approval requirements, such as having a good credit history.
It is concluded that the promotion of a more competitive small-scale sugarcane contractor
sector will alleviate many of the problems faced by small-scale contractors, such as the
inability to expand operations due to work allocation limitations . Competition would
also provide incentives for the provision of higher quality and cheaper services to SSGs.
There are potential steps that could be taken in the move to a more competitive sector;
112
these are (1) to allow the contractors to source their own work, (2) to communicate the
benefits of competition to stakeholders, (3) limit the authority of associations and sub-
committees, (4) to make current allocated tonnagestransferable, (5) to provide support in
the form of information and extension advice, (6) in the short-term provide a list of
charge-rates and price information of all contractors in the area, and lastly to
communicate the importance of customer satisfaction within a competitive situation to
SSGs.
Government also has a role to firstly strategise the creation of land markets in partnership
with those involved directly in the industry (e.g. South African Sugar Association
(SASA), milling companies). Thomson's (1996) recommendations for efficient land
rental markets may prove to be a useful guideline. Government needs to provide
improved rural infrastructure, mainly district roads, which would reduce haulage costs
and improve communication, as well as ensure unbiased tribal court rulings regardless of
social status. Government also needs to monitor court rulings and provide places of
appeal.
Labour legislation should be seriously reconsidered, particularly with regard to the
minimum wage bill, as many small-scale contractors simply cannot afford to pay the
legal wage to their unskilled labour, given their relatively high operation costs (high
transaction costs, diseconomies of size). Lastly, government needs to provide protection
for those competing for work, and the abuse of authority in communal areas needs to be
severely dealt with by law enforcement officers.
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made a Profit?
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LAND PREPARATION AND CROP MAINTENANCE
Land preparation system, area and travelling d istance between contractors ho m es tea d and fields:
.' .'; .':::· ....>',>":'!:f ; >2;1::a[ld;i:~~paration :systems · "."'><"", . .. . Own Sys tem (fiJUn I
. System A :' System'S SystemC >; ; '••System D; } 0 ::'·§YI1!1'I!I .E:L~ "({System.F, • ~:: SystinnG; : < Syst em H :0. System I : : "·:,·Syst em ·J·o" . "'.System K' . §ystemL
Rip Rip Rip Rip
Plough Plough Plough Plough Plough
Harrow Harrow Harrow Harrow Harrow Harrow Harrow
Plough Plough
Harrow Harrow Harrow Harrow Harrow Harrow Harrow
Ridge Ridge Ridge Ridge Ridge Ridge Ridge Ridge Ridge
Mln- toiler
Contract 2 Contraet3 . C9ntra~f4 ;
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Charge Rate - Rand/ha
Crop maintenance system, area and travelling d istance between contractors homestead and fields:
." Crop maintenance sys tems? ' .. '".' ....
System A Cultivate x one pass
System B Cultivate x two passes
Syst em C Boom sprayer x one pass
Syst em 0 Boom sprayer x two pass
System E Fertilising x one pass
Syste m F Fertilising x two pass
System G fiil in o""n If.diffElrenl" " ' 1
Syst em H fill in own If.different
Contract 1 Contract 2 Contract 3 Contract 4 ContractS . Contract 6 Contract 7 Cont ract 8 Contract 9 Contract 10 Contract 11 Contract 12
Crop mainte nanc e System
Area (ha)
Home-fie ld travel dist.(km)
Charge Rate - Rand/ha
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Other transporting tasks (p/ease state ):
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APPENDIX IB: Small-scale grower questionnaire
Sub-Committee/Grower Questionnaire
Name of Contractor Contractor No., _
Name oflnterviewer Date _
Name of Interviewee _ District _
Mill Association _
The following set of statements relates to the respondent's knowledge concerning the small-scale contractor
in question and the services they provide to small-scale growers. Please circle the number which
corresponds to the following statements.




4 = Strongly Agree
• moves the cane quickly to the loading zone/mill after it is cut (excludes 1 2 3 4
rainy periods) .
• ensures, to the best of his ability, cane is cut, carted and delivered to 1 2 3 4
the mill within 3 days (excludes rainy periods).
• meets his Daily Ratable Delivery (DRD) requirements on a daily basis. 1 2 3 4
• ,has machinery that does not often break down (excludes minor 1 2 3 4
problems such as punctures).
• is a good manager of his staff so that they work and perform well. 1 2 3 4
• seldom has d isagreements with his clients regarding the service he 1 2 3 4
provides to them.
Please Note . The information provided Will be kept strictly confidential.
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t t td' 11 f h IAPPENDIX 2 C t: a egories use m a oca mg au age areas os ra a
Mill Area Topography Haulage Type
Amatikulu Undulating & Undulating to Flat Indirect/Direct
Amatikulu (Delville) · Undulating & Undulating to Flat Indirect
Entumeni Steep & Steep to Flat Direct
Eston Undulating & Undulating to Flat Indirect
Felixton Irrigation Flat Indirect
Felixton North Flat Indirect
Felixton South Undulating & Undulating to Flat Indirect
Gledhow (Glendale) Steep & Steep to Flat Indirect
Gledhow (Melville) Undulating & Undulating to Flat Indirect
Maidstone Undulating & Undulating to Flat Indirect
~oordsberg Undulating & Undulating to Flat Indirect/Direct
Pongola (Makatini) Flat Indirect/Direct
Sezela (Mission) Steep & Steep to Flat Indirect
Sezela (Mthwalume) Steep & Steep to Flat Indirect
Sezela (Umzumbe) Steep & Steep to Flat Indirect
Sezela (Zamani) Steep & Steep to Flat Indirect
Umfolozi Undulating & Undulating to Flat Indirect
Umzimkulu Undulating & Undulating to Flat Indirect/Direct
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APPENDIX 3: The main questions asked during case study interviews
1) How is the small-scale contracting sector organised, e.g. SSGs, local associations , sub-
committees, contractors?
2) What are the functions of sub-committees and local associations within your area if
these bodies exist?
3) How does one enter into the industry as a contractor, i.e. what are the channels needed
to go through in order to source contractor work?
4) What are the main problems faced by contractors?
5) Have you heard of or found any solutions to these problems?
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APPENDIX 4: Characteristics of sample small-scale sugarcane contractors in ten
areas of KZN, 2002/03 (n=114)
General Characteristics Mean Education Distribution
Age in Years 52.1 No Education (%) 16.8
Experience in Years 10.1 Grade 8 or less (%) 38.1
Proportion of Females (%) 12.5 Grade 9-11 (%) 19.5
Proportion with Other
77.2 Grade 12 (%) 19.5
Sources of Income (%)
Proportion with Other Skills
50.0 Tertiary (%) 6.2
(%)
Tons transported Annually 6533.9
Tons transported Annually* 4859.9
*Excludmg those contractors transportmg more than 10 000 tons.
Note: Contractors transporting more than 10 000 tons only influenced the tonnage mean and are therefore
included in calculating all other characteristic means.
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APPENDIX 5: A brief overview of Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
The main purpose of Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is to reduce the dimensions in
a data set where many variables may be highly correlated while attempting to preserve as
much variation in the variables as possible. This technique is also used to economise on
the number of variables in a model. The resulting 'new' variables or Principal
Components (pes) are transformed, uncorrelated variables where few explain most of the
variation in all the original variables (Jolliffe, 1986: 1). PCA is a multivariate
transformation technique where PCs are obtained through linear transformations of the
original variables as follows:
where PCi = the score on the ith principal component;
i = 1. ..M principal components;
X, XM = are the original variables;
ail aiM = are the component loadings where ...
ail 2+ ai22+ ...+ aiM2 = the eigenvalue for PCi.
(6.1)
PCs formed equal the number of original variables, however, due to some components
explaining most of the variation in the original variables not all PCs need to be retained.
The number of PCs retained is based on the percentage variation explained by the PC as
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well as whether interpretation of the PC is meaningful. PCs are calculated in descending
order where the first PC accounts for most of the variation (Nieuwoudt, 1977: 79) .
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Variance Accounted 44.205 18.425
For
Note: Popsp = one If a contractor keeps popular spares on hand, zero
otherwise.
Dealer = one if a dealer exists in the area, zero otherwise.
Wkshp = one if there is a workshop in the area, zero otherwise.
Comair = one if compressed air is available in the area, zero
otherwise.
Distfuel= the distance to the nearest fuel supply (km).
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APPENDIX 7: Reliability of the contractor service quality model
The F statistic (3.847) shows that the null hypothesis of the model being statistically
significant is accepted (Gujarati, 1995: 247-248). The R2 value (0.428) indicates that 43
percent of the variation in SERV is accounted for by the explanatory variables. Although
this model may not be adequate for predictive purposes, it may be adequate for
explanatory and causality interpretations. There is no serious multicollinearity problem
as the highest correlation figure is 0.48 between INFOCONT and INFORADI. High
zero-order correlations are a sufficient but not necessary condition for multicollinearity to
exist, however, with the R2 being below 0.8 and with six explanatory variables having
significant coefficients in the model there is evidence that the degree of multicollinearity
is minimal. Further checks involve the Condition Index (Cl) and Variance Inflation
Factor (VIP). The maximum Cl is 39.628, which lies above the mid range of moderate
collinearity indicating the potential problem of multicollinearity, however, the highest
VIP was 2.056 for the explanatory variable INFOCONT. This is far below the critical
value of 10, which is further evidence of the low degree of multicollinearity (Gujarati,
1995: 335-339).
With cross-sectional data the order of the observations does not matter, hence serial
correlation cannot be a problem. However, spatial correlation (autocorrelation in cross-
sectional data) may be a problem. The Durban-Watson d statistic (1.877) for the
estimated model is in the "zone of indecision", so the hypothesis of the existence of
positive spatial correlation cannot be accepted or rejected (Gujarati, 1995: 420-425).
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The presence of heteroscedasticity may also be a problem where OLS coefficient
estimates are ineffic ient and inconsistent, and where standard deviations for these
estimates are incorrect. White's general heteroscedasticity test was used to examine the
presence of heteroscedasticity. The auxiliary regression R2 of the square of the model's
residual regressed on the included variables, the squares of the variables and the product
of all the included variables was 0.239. The regression sample size (86) multiplied by the
auxiliary R2 (0.239) is 20.554, which follows the chi-squared distribution with 21 degrees
of freedom. The critical values at the 5,10, and 25 percent levels are 32.671, 29.615, and
24.935, respectively. The chi-squared value attained does not exceed any of these levels;
it can therefore be concluded that heteroscedasticity is not a problem (Gujarati, 1995:
379-380).
The distribution of residuals for the model is presented in Figure 7.1. The standardised
residual plot is only slightly negatively skewed. Non-normality of the error term is
therefore unlikely to distort the t tests. Also, the normal probability plot of the
standardised residuals in Figure 7.2 shows the normality of the data by the low deviation
















Std. Dev = .91
Mean = 0.00
N = 87.00
Regress ion Standardized Residual


















Figure 7.2: Normal probability-plot of standardized residuals
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